The War On John Bell Hood: A Review of Wiley Sword's... "Embrace An Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah"

"The first law of the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice."  Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

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Celebrated Civil War author Wiley Sword describes Confederate General John Bell Hood's post-war memoir, Advance and Retreat, as full of "distortions, misrepresentations, and outright falsifications." This is a more accurate description of Sword’s own book than Hood's.

Sword's Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah is unfortunately an ultra-subjective and unbalanced work that will mesmerize unwitting readers with its credible style and tone. Sword's exhaustive research, intellect and gifted writing style could have served Civil War history with the most thorough analysis and presentation ever written on General Hood’s ill-fated 1864 Tennessee Campaign. Sadly, though, Sword resorts to hyperbole, concealment and fact filtering to portray Hood as a blundering, ignorant, vindictive and even murderous character.

In the waning months of the War for Southern Independence, a desperate Confederate President Jefferson Davis, acknowledging the fading fortunes of the Confederacy, appointed the young Hood, his aggressive and fiercely loyal fellow Kentuckian, to command the Army of Tennessee. His orders were to repel Gen. William T. Sherman's Union Army, marching relentlessly upon Atlanta. Taking command when Sherman had advanced to within 15 miles of central Atlanta, Hood successfully defended the key southern city for 46 days before evacuating his army on September 4, 1864.

The post-Atlanta disposition of the Army of Tennessee was pondered by Davis, his advisors, and his cabinet, and after much consideration, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard approved an invasion of Tennessee. Hood's mission was to conquer the Federal fortress of Nashville, seize its considerable stores of much-needed munitions and supplies, and threaten Kentucky and Ohio. Confederate success in Tennessee would likewise force a retrograde by Sherman, who had embarked on his March to the Sea, and provide relief for Gen. Robert E. Lee's beleaguered Army of Northern Virginia, then under intense pressure from Union forces led by Ulysses S. Grant. The Confederate government was in dire political need of a significant military victory, with resources and public will being rapidly depleted, and Abraham Lincoln having won re-election in November 1864. Lee's surrender at Appomattox, a mere 16 weeks after the Confederate defeat at the climactic Battle of Nashville, ultimately confirmed the desperate plight of the Confederacy in late 1864.

Hood marched north out of Florence, Alabama, in mid-November 1864 with 33,000 infantry and cavalry and confronted Union Gen. John Schofield's 20,000 Federals at Spring Hill, Tennessee, on Nov. 29. Schofield was retreating from Pulaski, Tennessee, to Nashville to join forces with Union Gen. George Thomas's strengthening garrison. Schofield escaped Spring Hill that night, and a desperate battle was fought in nearby Franklin, Tennessee, the next day as Hood attempted to destroy Schofield before he reached Nashville, some 15 miles away. The Battle of Franklin severely weakened Hood's army, who then followed Schofield's retreating forces toward Nashville. Establishing defensive positions outside of Nashville and requesting reinforcements, Hood's army was routed by Thomas's combined forces on December 15 and 16, with the remnants of Hood's Army of Tennessee retreating to Tupelo, Mississippi. Hood resigned his command in mid-January 1865.

Throughout Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah, Sword selectively includes opinions, statistics and quotes only from sources critical of Hood, while frequently censoring Hood’s supporters. Sword rarely refers to sources that comment favorably on Hood, and on those rare occasions, questions their accuracy and credibility. However, most disturbing is the existence of major factual errors germane to critical issues of Hood's decisions during the campaign – inaccuracies so glaring that they seem to suggest intentional misrepresentation by Sword.

On page 179, Sword makes the case that Hood should have allowed Confederate cavalry commander Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest to attempt a flanking movement around Franklin. Sword writes, "Of specific use to Forrest was Hollow Tree Gap, a defile in the range of hills through which the Nashville Pike passed, only about four and a half miles distant from Hood's present position. Here the Yankees might be cut off from Nashville, urged Forrest, since Hood's army was as close to this gap as was Schofield's at Franklin."

Hollow Tree Gap ("Holly Tree Gap" on modern maps) was indeed 4.5 miles from the Federal lines at the Carter House, but was approximately 7 miles from Hood's pre-battle position near the Harrison House on the Columbia Pike south of Franklin.  Additionally, Forrest and his requested division of infantry would have had to travel approximately 12 to15 miles by circuitous march east and north to Hollow Tree Gap.  With only 3 hours of daylight, a successful flanking movement by Forrest would have been impossible.

Hollow Tree Gap was at least double, and more probably triple, the distance for the Confederates as it was for Schofield.  For Sword to clearly and unequivocally write that the Confederates and the Federals were equidistant from Hollow Tree Gap – the point where the Union retreat could be blocked – is incorrect and very misleading. The misinformation makes Hood look ignorant, incompetent, or worse, by making Forrest's impossible proposal appear practicable.

Sword's concealment of corroborative sources supportive of Hood is likewise glaring. An example of a well-known source excluded by Sword is Confederate Sgt. Major S.A. Cunningham, who served under Hood in the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns. Sword criticizes Hood for attacking Schofield at Franklin and presents concurrences of several sources to support that opinion. Excluded, however, are sources such as Cunningham who, writing in the April 1893 issue of The Confederate Veteran, commented on Hood's dilemma when deciding whether to attack Schofield at Franklin. Cunningham, who had been standing near Hood on Winstead Hill overlooking the Union positions at Franklin, stated, "It was all important [for Hood] to act, if at all, at once." Regarding the debacle at Spring Hill on the previous night, Cunningham described the escape of the Federal army as "a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame." Such readily-available historical information is never revealed in Sword's book.

Setting the anti-Hood tone early in the book (on page 9) while elaborating on Hood's lack of character and intellect, Sword paints Hood as overly ambitious and cites a letter from Hood to Robert E. Lee dated April 29, 1863.  Sword writes, "He [Hood] boldly asserted his ideas to the high command.  A letter to his ‘friend’ Robert E. Lee suggested that smaller-sized army corps might be beneficial.  Perhaps Lee might favor Hood with such a command?"  Yet Sword denies his readers the text of a letter from Lee to Jefferson Davis just 11 days later on May 10, 1863.  Lee wrote, "I have for the past year felt that the corps of this army were too large for one commander . . . Each corps contains, when in fighting condition, about 30,000 men.  These are more than one man can properly handle and keep under his eye in battle in the country that we have to operate in. They are always beyond the range of his vision, and frequently beyond his reach . . ."  Were Hood's "bold assertions" to Lee really so bold?  Apparently Lee shared Hood's views on the ideal size of army corps.  And apparently Wiley Sword did not want his readers to know it. 

Throughout his book, Sword alleges a hatred for Hood by his troops and subordinates. Words of disrespect and disdain are frequently quoted. Again, Sword curiously omits words of affection and respect for Hood which are included in the post-war memoirs of credible and well-known sources. Private Sam Watkins, who served under Hood at Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville as a member of the First Tennessee Infantry (CS) authored his famous memoir, Company Aytch, in 1881. Watkins, who award-winning Civil War historian Shelby Foote called "my favorite Civil War memorialist," wrote several affectionate passages about Hood. Curiously, Sword frequently uses Watkins as a source in his book, but omits all of Watkins's affectionate words for Hood. Apparently Sword considers Watkins as credible, but his kind words for Hood are disregarded. Among Watkins's comments on Hood, though not included by Sword, is on page 179, "He [Hood] was a noble, brave and good man, and we loved him for his many virtues and goodness of heart." On page 182 of his memoir, Watkins writes, "We all loved Hood; he was such a clever fellow and a good man." On page 206, he writes of Hood, "Poor fellow, I loved him, not as a general, but as a good man. I knew that when that army order was read, that (Hood) had been deceived, and that the poor fellow was only trying to encourage his men. Every impulse of his nature was to do good and to serve his country as best he could." On page 225, Watkins writes, "General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die had been cast. Our cause had been lost before he took command. He fought with the fierceness of the wounded tiger and the everlasting grip of the bulldog. The army had been decimated until it was a mere skeleton . . . when he commenced his march into Tennessee."

Although Sword deemed it not worthy for inclusion in his own book, Watkins offered a poignant testimony of his love for his former commander when he penned the following epitaph for John Bell Hood in The Southern Bivouac 2 (May 1884):399-400: 

But the half of brave Hood's body molders here:
The rest was lost in honors’ bold career.
Both limbs and fame he scattered all around,
Yet still, though mangled, was with honor crowned;
For ever ready with his blood to part,
War left him nothing whole – except his heart.

In describing the ferocity of the Battle of Franklin, Sword cites the recollections of Col. Virgil S. Murphey of the 17th Alabama Infantry several times in the book. Murphey was captured at Franklin and wrote his diary while imprisoned at Johnson's Island. Although he considers Murphey credible, Sword nonetheless chooses to conceal from the reader all of Murphey's entries where his strong support of General Hood is expressed. Murphey wrote, "Had Hood succeeded, Nashville would have opened her gates to the head of his victorious legions and the throat of Tennessee released from the grasp of remorseless despotism. It was worth the hazard. Its failure does not diminish the value of the prize."

Holding Hood blameless for the Federal escape at Spring Hill, Murphey added, "The same blow delivered with equal power at Spring Hill or Thompson's Station would have yielded us dominion over Tennessee. A failure to obey [Hood's] order lost us a noble commonwealth." Recalling a conversation with Union General Schofield, who had acknowledged his army's "perilous position" at Spring Hill, Murphey wrote, "I explained that a grave responsibility rested upon the general who failed to make the attack [at Spring Hill] as we knew our advantage and Hood had ordered the attack." Murphey added, "Our government had placed Hood in command, and as such I yielded to him my confidence and cordial cooperation."

Murphey further recalled being held in Nashville with other prisoners when word came that Hood's army was moving toward Nashville. "About 300 Yankee bounty jumpers and prisoners in the yard yelled with delight and declared their readiness to rejoin Hood." Sword silences Murphey only when praise and support is voiced for General Hood.

Hood's Union counterpart at Franklin, Gen. John Schofield wrote in his memoir, "Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so able a general as J.E.Johnston has characterized it as ‘useless butchery'. These criticisms are based on a misapprehension of the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been aware of our relative weakness of numbers at Franklin, and of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30 or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides our position with the river on our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary. The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost."  Schofield's memoir, Forty-Six Years in the Army, is a prominent source in Sword's bibliography, but Sword denies his readers Schofield's own explanation of Hood's actions at Franklin.  Unless Sword was intentionally trying to mislead his readers, why would he quote Schofield's memoirs extensively in his book, but filter out Schofield's comments that don't support Sword's demonization of Hood?     

Although it is not known whether Sword's extensive research included Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons's 1866 memoir, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, Sword would no doubt have concealed the following passage: "In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center – involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy? In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains – only fordable by infantry at one or two places – and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds – a vastly superior force – in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation."

Hood's supporters and admirers were not limited to enlisted soldiers and subordinates. Commenting on Hood's resignation as commander of the Army of Tennessee after the defeat at Nashville, Confederate President Jefferson Davis wrote after the war, "General Hood was relieved at his reiterated request . . . and that it was in no wise due to a want of confidence in him on my part." Yet Sword describes Hood's resignation as a cynical attempt to manipulate sympathy, to shirk his responsibility for the failure of the Tennessee Campaign, and to maintain his opportunities for future commands. Sword opines that Davis was dissatisfied with Hood and essentially fired him, a theory inconsistent with Davis's own words.

Another prominent player in the drama of the 1864 Tennessee Campaign, cited in Sword's book but whose support for Hood is censored, was Tennessee Gov. Isham Harris, who accompanied the Army of Tennessee during the campaign. In a letter to Jefferson Davis on December 25, 1864, Harris wrote, "I have been with General Hood from the beginning of the campaign, and, beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, nor neglected anything that he should have done which it was possible to do. Indeed, the more that I have seen and known of him and his policy, the more that I have been pleased with him and regret to say that if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results would have been very different."

Throughout Sword’s book, countless examples of overt bias can be identified. Sword's attacks on Hood are both personal and professional. Although John Bell Hood was famous for his powerful physique and handsome appearance, Sword's very first mention of Hood describes him as "a backwoods lumberjack masquerading in a Confederate general's uniform" (page 6). For this insult, the usually creative Sword borrowed without credit from, and paraphrased, the description of Hood in the unpublished memoirs of Col. J.C. Haskell, who confided in his diary that Hood, then a young lieutenant colonel of the Texas Brigade, looked like "a raw backwoodsman, dressed up in an ill-fitting uniform." Also, under the photo of Hood in the center of the book, unable to say anything complimentary, Sword uses a puzzling expression, describing Hood as "almost handsome." This is, in and of itself, unimportant but very revealing of Sword's prejudice. Countless contemporary sources described Hood's awesome and attractive physical appearance, among them Philip Daingerfield Stephenson of the Fifth Washington (Louisiana) Artillery. Although a harsh critic of Hood, Stephenson wrote, "Hood’s personal appearance was striking and commanding. He was over six feet and of splendid proportions . . . (his) eyes were large and bold . . . The general effect of his presence was impressive . . . he  was always scrupulously neat and even elegant in attire.” Stephenson continued, ". . . of magnificent and striking appearance. With his yellow waving hair and great tawny beard and big bold blue eyes and Herculean frame, he looked like a gigantic old Saxon chieftain come to life again. He won the hearts of men right and left." Wiley Sword's backwoods lumberjack was Captain Stephenson's Greek God and reincarnated Saxon chieftain.

Venomous attacks on every aspect of Hood's personal character reveal the prejudice that permeates the book and causes Sword to insult John Bell Hood, the human being as well as the soldier, literally from cradle to grave. Near the end of the book, on page 439, Sword writes, "As if to refute any inference that he might be a 'lame' lover due to his crippled body, Hood fathered eleven children . . .” discounting the possibility that Hood might have loved his wife and wanted the typically large family of that era. Sword apparently sees no harm in reducing John Bell and Anna Hood's many present-day descendents to mere products of a man siring children in vain demonstrations of virility. Of Sword's many cheap shots and low blows, this comment crosses the line of dignity and decency.

In perhaps the most insulting comment of the book, on page 263 Sword declares that Hood was "a fool with a license to kill his own men." This comment surpasses outrageousness and is undignified from an author of Sword's stature. Hood was recommended for promotion to major general by "Stonewall" Jackson, recommended for promotion to lieutenant general by James Longstreet, and recommended for promotion to full general by Jefferson Davis, who later wrote in his memoirs, "If he had, by an impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army, we should never have heard complaint because Hood attacked Franklin, and these were the hopes with which he made his assault." Yet according to Wiley Sword, Hood was a murderous fool.

Examples of Sword's propensity to offer interpretations in any way unflattering to Hood are also indicated by his descriptions of Hood's childhood and West Point experiences. Sword calls Hood an "ill-mannered hellion" (page 6) as a youth. Undocumented family and regional lore describes young John Bell Hood as perhaps gregarious – a trait not uncommon to children who would later pursue military careers – but there is no evidence whatsoever of rebellious or destructive behavior, and certainly no known historical record of any legal problems. Sword states that Hood was from a privileged family when in fact evidence indicates that his father struggled financially. In fact, credible sources state that in 1830 Hood's father moved temporarily to Owingsville, Kentucky, to pursue patients suffering from a fever outbreak, as his medical practice was struggling in Mt. Sterling, Kentucky. Early tax records from Montgomery County, Kentucky, were destroyed by fire, and it is impossible to ascertain Dr. Hood's wealth and property. The Hoods’ Reid Village, Kentucky, home where young John Bell grew up, was, even by nineteenth century standards, comfortable, but not extravagant. The lack of evidence of slave quarters at the home, which still stands in rural Montgomery County, Kentucky, indicates that Hood's father had few (if any) slaves relative to the size of the family farm, an indication of modest wealth. These facts however are inconsistent with the "spoiled rich kid" image of Hood that Sword portrays.

Astonishingly, Sword even asserts a lack of respect and confidence in young John Bell Hood by his own father. On page 7, Sword chose to repeat the undocumented, unverifiable word-of-mouth legend of Dr. Hood telling his son, "If you can't behave, don't come home [from West Point] . . . .Go to the nearest gate post and butt your brains out." However, Sword elects to conceal from the reader the verifiable historical fact that in March 1856 Hood was called home from Ft. Mason on the Texas frontier to attend to the financial and personal affairs of his ailing father. With his wife, a daughter, and two sons, one older and one younger than John Bell, still in Montgomery County, Kentucky, why would Dr. Hood choose a precocious and irresponsible John Bell, serving in the army 1,500 miles away, as the executor of his estate?

Sword further describes Hood as managing to "prod and squirm his way" (page 6) through West Point. He writes that Hood accumulated 196 demerits his senior year, four short of expulsion. Sword's research would also have shown that on another year Hood accumulated only 18 demerits, one of the best discipline records in his class, and his four-year total of 374 was about average for all cadets. Another point, certainly known by Sword, but not included in his book, is that Hood did indeed accumulate 196 demerits during his senior year, most of which were awarded for an unauthorized Dec. 21, 1852, pre-Christmas visit to nearby Benny Haven's Tavern. Being four demerits short of expulsion, remarkably, Hood accumulated no demerits over the next six months, an outstanding display of conduct and personal discipline. However, this would not fit Sword's negative template of Hood, and the reader is therefore denied the information. A few years after his graduation, in 1860 Hood would be ordered to serve as chief instructor of cavalry at West Point. Why would the superintendent of West Point want to subject young, impressionable cadets to an intellectually-deficient, "ill-mannered hellion" who had just managed to "prod and squirm" his way through the school? The common thread throughout Sword's book is to portray Hood in every possible negative way, accentuating his negatives, and omitting or minimizing his positive qualities.

Early in the book, Sword paints Hood as intellectually deficient by detailing his low academic ranking at West Point, and then reinforces the unflattering image throughout the book by dispersing comments and quotes by selected Confederate and Union officers who doubted Hood's intellect. Hood indeed graduated 44th of 52 in the West Point Class of 1853, however Sword doesn't mention that the Class of 1853 started with a total of 93 cadets in 1849, and of the 41 cadets who did not graduate, the vast majority were expelled for academic or disciplinary performance. It would be more accurate to view Hood as ranked 44th out of 93 original cadets in his class.  Furthermore, class ranking at West Point was never a fail-safe indicator of postgraduate accomplishment. Of the multitude of West Point graduates who served in the Civil War, many renowned commanders ranked in the lower half of their West Point classes. Among these were Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, generals William Hardee, W.H.T. Walker, James Longstreet, Earl Van Dorn, D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, W. Kirby Smith, Fitzhugh Lee and Joe Wheeler, and Union generals Ulysses S. Grant, Phil Sheridan, Don Carlos Buell, Winfield Scott Hancock, George Stoneman, George Crook, and Alexander McCook.  Experienced professional Civil War historians such as Wiley Sword know this, but Sword elects to keep his readers uninformed of facts that do not degrade Hood.  

Sword consistently attributes Hood's successes as a brigade and division commander to luck. Sword accredits his early promotion to colonel of the 4th Texas Infantry as "due to President Jefferson Davis's notice of Hood's role in a minor skirmish" (page 8). Sword writes, "By good luck and opportune timing . . . [page 7] Hood's extraordinary luck had resulted in his promotion to brigadier general . . ." [page 8]. "[Hood] . . . seemed to bear such a charmed existence that it appeared he might just be destiny's child" [page 9]. Sword does not allow any compliment or achievement by Hood to go without an unflattering editorial qualification. In Sword's prejudicial view, luck plays a major role in all of Hood's successes, but never in his failures.

Throughout the book, Sword elaborates on all common criticisms of Hood and states his agreement with them. However, Sword paraphrases any complimentary statements of Hood's contemporaries, negatively commenting on their credibility and motives. The examples are too many to detail.

Sword elaborates his disdain at the inappropriateness of Hood's correspondence with Jefferson Davis during the Atlanta Campaign, strongly condemning Hood for such "highly unethical and improper conduct" (page 25). Sword does not state that such behavior was not uncommon during that era, and does not offer the probability that Hood was simply following the instructions of his commander-in-chief, who was seeking to be kept informed on a critical matter – the survival of Atlanta. The Army of Tennessee commander, Gen. Joseph Johnston, had consistently angered and frustrated the Confederate government and high command in all of his prior commands since 1861, refusing to communicate with or notify Richmond of his movements and intentions. Nevertheless, on page 427 Sword mentions – without critical comment – that Gen. S.D. Lee contacted Hood's immediate superior Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard on Dec. 25, 1864, wishing to discuss "recent events in Tennessee." On the same page, Sword details, also without critical comment, Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest's Jan. 2, 1865, letter to Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana commander Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor. Sword apparently has no problem with other generals having done precisely what he condemns Hood for doing.

Furthermore, Hood was not the only Confederate commander to express concern to Richmond regarding Johnston's Atlanta strategy, a fact certainly not unknown to an accomplished researcher like Sword. On June 22, 1864, Johnston's trusted subordinate, close confidant and corps commander Gen.William Hardee wrote to Jefferson Davis, "If the present system continues, we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a serious battle is fought." Another of Johnston's corps commanders, Gen. A. P. Stewart, wrote to Davis's military advisor, Braxton Bragg, on March 19, 1864, "Are we to hold still, remaining on the defensive in this position until [Sherman] comes down with his combined armies to drive us out?" It is well known in the Civil War history community that all three of Joseph Johnston's corps commanders secretly corresponded with Richmond over the plight of Atlanta, yet Sword discriminates against his selected villain John Bell Hood, while intentionally denying the reader additional information which does not support his theme.

Only when convenient to support his bias, Sword classifies statements by Hood as sincere and accurate. Sword describes a statement by Hood, observing that the Army of Tennessee had become unwilling to fight aggressively on the offensive,  as a "candid admission of what dominated his [Hood's] reasoning at Franklin." Hood wrote, "The discovery that the Army was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concerns. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It seemed to me that I had exhausted every means to remove this stumbling block to the Army of Tennessee." Condemning Hood for such feelings and openly stating that Hood ordered the charge at Franklin to punish the army, Sword, who quotes Hood's corps commander, Gen S.D. Lee, extensively in the book, nevertheless chose to not include Lee's own description of the diminished aggressiveness of the Army of Tennessee. Lee wrote in the official reports, "The majority of the officers and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks, that when orders were given for attack, and there was a probability of encountering works, they did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always assures success." Sword of course censors Lee, as his views were consistent with Hood's.

On multiple occasions throughout the book, Sword criticizes Hood for constantly blaming others for every failure. However, in both Mary Chesnut's acclaimed Diary From Dixie and Sam Watkins's memoirs, there is mention of Hood's personal lament at his defeats, his contrition, and his acceptance of blame. Sword frequently sources Chesnut and Watkins in his book, but not when their testimony is inconsistent with his anti-Hood premise. Also concealed from readers are Hood's own words in his postwar memoirs, "I failed utterly to give battle at Spring Hill," and in his memoirs and official report, Hood complimented the gallantry of the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee at the Battle of Franklin. In his Army of Tennessee resignation letter, Gen. Hood took responsibility for the Tennessee Campaign, writing, "I am alone responsible for its conception..." Near the end of the Nashville retreat, at Shoal Creek, Alabama, W.G. Davenport of the 6th Texas Cavalry wrote that Gen Hood approached a group of soldiers and "Looking worn and tired but with kindly words for all, said to the soldiers, 'Boys, this is all my fault.'" It is hypocritical that Sword condemns Hood for blaming others, when Sword blames Hood for everything and blames others for nothing. 

Likewise Sword asserts that Gen. Hood accused his soldiers of cowardice.  Sword supports this utterly ludicrous and libelous assertion by concealing from readers Gen. Hood’s words of praise and admiration for the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. Gen. Hood, in Advance and Retreat, praised the “extraordinary gallantry” of the soldiers at Franklin, and in his official report wrote, "Never did troops fight more gallantly."

However, the highest praise Gen. Hood reaped upon his troops was comparing them to his own namesake Hood’s Texas Brigade.  In his postwar memoirs Hood wrote, "The attack (at Franklin), which entailed so great a sacrifice of life, had become a necessity as imperative as that which impelled Gen. Lee to order the assault at Gaines’ Mill, when our troops charged across an open space, a distance of one mile, under a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, against an enemy heavily entrenched. The heroes in that action fought not more gallantly than the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee upon the fields of Franklin." Although Sword uses Gen. Hood’s memoirs when convenient, he omits this passage from his book.

Regarding Sword's statistics, on page 425 the persistent Sword provides misleading and erroneous data, accompanied by his omni-present anti-Hood analysis. In summarizing the total campaign losses of the Army of Tennessee, Sword writes, “Hood had suffered during the campaign perhaps 23,500 casualties from a total strength of about 38,000 men." Searching for a suitable anti-Hood superlative, Sword adds, "This appalling loss of nearly two-thirds of a major American army as a result of actual fighting was unprecedented. Never had there been such an overwhelming victory during the Civil War – indeed never in American military history."

Eluding notice by all but the most alert reader, Sword passively mentions that his statistics include Confederate casualties incurred from September 7, 1864. This date is a full 10 weeks prior to commencement of Hood's Tennessee Campaign, a fact that was certainly known to the learned Sword but will go unnoticed by most unwary readers. The casualty statistics therefore include, among other non-Tennessee Campaign engagements, the Oct. 5, 1864, Battle of Allatoona Pass, where Maj. Gen. Samuel French, in independent command of a division of Hood's infantry, sustained 800 casualties. Also, by including all Confederate prisoners held in Nashville in January 1865, Sword's statistics include prisoners taken by Federal forces from other areas of Tennessee and surrounding states who were not even a part of Hood's command.

Sword's statistical sleight of hand continues by informing readers that, under Hood's command, the Army of Tennessee numbered only 14,500 after the Tennessee Campaign. Official records state that 17,000 infantry and approximately 3,000 cavalry were on hand in Tupelo, Mississippi, after the Nashville retreat. Thus, Sword inflates casualties sustained under Hood by an astonishing 5,500!

Additionally, Sword quietly mentions – without the fanfare that accompanies any statistics or sources that cast a bad light on Hood – that there were 13,189 prisoners held by the Federals after Nashville. Scores of these 13,000 had actually surrendered, rather than were captured, and in the context of Sword's argument, there is a major difference between surrender and capture. The Confederate soldiers, with bare feet bleeding from walking on frozen ground, and starving, quite understandably gave up. Sam Watkins recalled of the retreat from Nashville, "More than ten thousand had stopped and allowed themselves to be captured" (pages 209-210). S.A. Cunningham wrote of the epidemic of desertions during the retreat from Nashville, "By this time nearly all the Tennesseans were gone home. They either had written furloughs or took French leave [deserted]."

Thousands surrendered and deserted due to four years of death and deprivation of warfare, circumstances not solely of General Hood's making. Yet they are included in Sword's statistics along with captured and missing in order to create the most sensational statistical model of a military defeat. Had the campaign occurred earlier in the war, many retreating Confederates certainly wouldn't have opted for the relative comfort of a Federal prison, or given up and gone home. Nonetheless, in his official report, a grateful Hood thanked the soldiers who did not desert, writing, "When the fortunes of war were against us, the same faithful soldiers remained true to their flag and, with rare exceptions,  followed it in retreat as they had borne it in advance."

If the "captured" numbers would be modified to a realistic number consistent with most major Civil War battles (in effect omitting the massive surrenders at Nashville and desertions during the retreat), actual Confederate casualties resulting exclusively from combat during the Tennessee Campaign would be around 10,000 to 12,000. According to casualty records compiled in Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, Confederate casualties in the entire Tennessee Campaign, although higher, do not deviate significantly from the 24.6% average casualty rate for the 12 largest Civil War engagements. Hood's defeats at Franklin and Nashville were certainly decisive, with Franklin especially tragic, but Sword again engages in sensational hyperbole to cast the most negative possible pale on Hood's overall campaign performance.

Has Sword ever contended anywhere in his extensive writing and lecturing that Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was "destroyed" in its final campaign of the war? Or does Sword agree that Lee indeed surrendered a functional army? In an April 10, 1865, letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee details the manpower situation with the Army of Northern Virginia on its final retreat to Appomattox. Lee wrote, "At the commencement of the withdrawal of the army from the lines on the night of the 2d, it began to disintegrate, and straggling from the ranks increased up to the surrender on the 9th.   On that day, as previously reported, there were only seven thousand eight hundred and ninety-two (7,892) effective infantry.   During the night, when the surrender became known, more than ten thousand men came in, as reported to me by the Chief Commissary of the Army. During the succeeding days stragglers continued to give themselves up, so that on the 12th April, according to the rolls of those paroled, twenty-six thousand and eighteen (26,018) officers and men had surrendered.  Men who had left the ranks on the march, and crossed James River, returned and gave themselves up, and many have since come to Richmond and surrendered." If Sword would apply the same logic and statistical interpretations to Robert E. Lee that he does to John Bell Hood, he should proclaim that since only 8,000 troops were on hand at Appomattox, from an army that began the campaign with over 26,000 men, the Army of Northern Virginia was thus "destroyed" prior to the surrender. This should be a startling statistic to Sword, who wrote of Hood's Tennessee Campaign, "This appalling loss of nearly two-thirds of a major American army as a result of actual fighting was unprecedented. Never had there been such an overwhelming victory during the Civil War – indeed, never in American military history." Using Sword's definition of losses, Lee lost approximately 70% of his troops on his final campaign, a much higher percentage of losses than Hood's Tennessee Campaign.

Likewise eluding Sword's label as a destroyer of his own army is Gen. Kirby Smith, who addressed the deserters of his disintegrated army in his May 30, 1865, proclamation, "I am left a commander without an army, a general without troops; you have made your choice. It was unwise and unpatriotic, but it is final." It is doubtful that Wiley Sword or any other Civil War scholar would assert that Kirby Smith or Robert E. Lee destroyed their own armies, yet such an accusation is commonly directed at Hood.

However, the most outrageous example of Sword's bias is the utterly unsubstantiated suggestion of drug abuse by Hood on the night of Nov. 29, 1864, at Spring Hill. The presentation of such a thoroughly outrageous theory borders on tabloid journalism and has unfortunately been given "legs" in the modern Civil War history community by being included in a work by a renowned and reputable author such as Sword. In chapters 15 and 16, Sword mentions drug impairment of Hood's mental capacity multiple times, using suggestive, yet deniable, words such as "possible," "perhaps," "may," and "might." As a thorough and skilled researcher, Sword is well aware that there is absolutely no substantiation whatsoever in any of the numerous historical records to this slanderous drug rumor, yet he engages in conjecture to plant unflattering subliminal suggestions in the minds of readers. The fact is that on the night of Nov. 29, Hood retired in the mid-evening. He shared a bedroom with another staff officer and Tennessee Gov. Isham Harris. He was awakened by generals Stewart and Forrest around eleven o'clock and had a lengthy meeting regarding intricate troop movements and positioning. Hood was again awakened after midnight and he and his staff discussed Union troop locations with an enlisted man who had been behind Union lines. None of these individuals ever mentioned, or even suggested that Hood was in any way impaired. Forrest was an outspoken Hood critic who spoke extensively after the war. Forrest would not have hesitated to expose such irresponsible conduct by Hood, yet never once did he suggest alcohol or drug abuse impairment by Hood.

The lack of balance and censorship in Embrace an Angry Wind dilutes the otherwise excellent presentation of the battles, and the poignant experiences of the veterans. Although each of the previously stated examples of bias and evidence suppression does not individually prove the author's subjectivity, they are in the totality of the book, indicative of a deep prejudice and pretense.

No serious student of Civil War history would ever endorse John Bell Hood's performance in the 1864 Tennessee Campaign. Hood made a fateful decision at 4:00 p.m. on Nov. 30, 1864, that had tragic results. The resolve of the Federal troops, the opportunistic proximity of Union Col. Emerson Opdyke's unit at the most critical moment in the battle, and many other circumstances resulted in a decisive Union victory. General Hood must accept ultimate responsibility for the defeat, just as he would have accepted credit had a Confederate victory occurred. However, Sword's contention about Hood's selfish ambition and chagrin leading men to their deaths is frankly absurd. The dictionary defines ambition as "an eager desire for power." Hood was already admired throughout the South and had attained the rank of full general – equal to the rank of Robert E. Lee. There was no greater power or higher promotion available for him. He was at the apex of his career. In the autumn of 1864 his reputation had nowhere to go but down.

A Chinese proverb states, "A writer sells few books if he writes only the truth." The simple truth about John Bell Hood's 1864 Tennessee Campaign was apparently not enough for Wiley Sword. Perhaps he felt the book would be more attractive and entertaining by creating an evil villain to blame for the failure of the campaign. However, a fair and objective assessment of historical records could only conclude that Hood was but one of several individuals whose collective errors of judgment, along with the valor and grit of Schofield's opportunistic Federals, led to the decisive Confederate defeats at Franklin and Nashville. These truths might not produce titillation and controversy, but they would be more palatable to those who appreciate fairness and objectivity in a nonfiction work.

For the time being, Wiley Sword has attained a position of prominence in the Civil War history community and is reaping the fruits of his celebrity. Sadly though, to accomplish this he has compromised journalistic and scholastic integrity and shamelessly slandered the historical legacy of a defenseless dead Southern patriot who gave half his limbs for his country. Both John Bell Hood and American history deserve better.

Review by:

S. M. "Sam" Hood
Huntington, WV
June, 2007