Furthermore, class ranking at West Point has never been a fail-safe indicator of postgraduate accomplishment. Of the multitude of West Point graduates who served in the Civil War, many renowned commanders ranked in the lower half of their West Point classes. Among these were Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, generals William Hardee, W.H.T. Walker, James Longstreet, Earl Van Dorn, D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, W. Kirby Smith, Fitzhugh Lee and Joe Wheeler, and Union generals Ulysses S. Grant, Phil Sheridan, Don Carlos Buell, Winfield Scott Hancock, George Stoneman, George Crook, and Alexander McCook.

Hood's discipline record was actually quite impressive. His demerit record was among the best in his class in his first year, and was about average during his second and third years. During his final year, the new West Point Superintendent Robert E. Lee initiated a more stern discipline enforcement policy. Hood and a classmate from Missouri were cited for being Absent Without Permission for a pre-Christmas visit to nearby Benny Haven's Tavern on Dec. 21, 1852, and were given substantial demerits. His total demerits thus reached 196, only 4 short of expulsion. However, in a display of remarkable conduct and discipline, Hood would complete the final 5 months at the academy receiving no additional demerits. Hood was in fact ordered to return to West Point in September of 1860 to serve as Chief Instructor of Cavalry. The administration of the academy would certainly not have wanted cadets to be subjected to instructors who were unintelligent or undisciplined.

There is no historical record whatsoever of any legal problems by young John Bell Hood in Montgomery County, Kentucky. His reputation for being overly gregarious or contrary appears to have developed decades after his death, and seems to be more mythical than factual. Author James Dyer commented in the "Gallant Hood," the earliest of the major Hood biographies, of Hood proudly proclaiming that he led other youths into trouble. This original comment on Hood's childhood demeanor, frequently repeated in modern publications and lectures, is sourced to an oral statement by one of Hood's distant relatives being interviewed by Dyer in the 1950's, a hundred years after John Bell Hood's childhood. A verbal description of Hood's adolescent personality, unsupported by any historical evidence of illegal, destructive, or rebellious conduct by John Bell Hood in his entire life, from infancy to adulthood, in military and civilian life, would seem to be less than credible. Yet, they are repeatedly presented by modern scholars as fact.

Young John Bell Hood likewise is commonly portrayed as a lustful pursuer of girls. This legend seems to have evolved primarily from the famous "Anne's Curse" folktale. An article in the October 25, 1948 issue of Life Magazine told the titillating story of the forbidden courtship of young John Bell Hood and Kentucky belle Anne Mitchell. The legend told of Anne's death by lightning, suicides, unexplained deaths, and disappearances of those whom she cursed, and Anne's ghost haunting the hills of Montgomery County, Kentucky near John Bell Hood's home. However, what is never told is that in 1948 a $275,000 libel lawsuit was filed against Life Magazine by Sidney Hart Anderson, a relative of a character in the article, claiming that the story was false. The lawsuit eventually settled, with Life Magazine paying an undisclosed sum to the relative. Nevertheless, modern authors and historians, unable or unwilling to resist the temptation to sensationalize John Bell Hood in any way possible, perpetuate a "womanizer" reputation of Hood, who married soon after the war, and fathered 11 children with his beloved wife Anna Hennen.

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Myth: Hood always attacked, and made frontal assaults.

Reality: Hood was a disciple of Lee and Jackson, whose military philosophies relied heavily on wrestling the initiative from the adversary and holding it. Jefferson Davis wrote of Hood in his memoirs, "Hood had served with distinction under Lee and Jackson, and his tactics were of that school." His early experiences at Eltham's Landing, and especially Gaines's Mill, were successful, and purely offensive. At the decisive Confederate victory at Second Manassas, Longstreet's Corps was on the offensive, with Hood's brigades leading the charge and given much of the credit for the defeat of Pope's Federals. At Antietam, with no other viable options, Hood's 2,000 troops attacked 12,000 Federals and the shock and confusion of his attack held off the numerically stronger Union troops, earning a critically important tactical victory. Hood's assault at Chickamauga achieved the initial breakthrough of the Union lines. Hood also participated in the Battle of Fredericksburg, where Lee, although outnumbered 2-1, devastated Burnside's Army of the Potomac with a bold and daring offensive maneuver by "Stonewall" Jackson.

However, even influenced by these experiences, Hood was the primary proponent in convincing Lee and Longstreet to cease the attack and withdraw his division after the successful assault against Union General Hatch's division at Groveton on the second day at Second Manassas. At South Mountain, where Hood's brigade engaged the Federals at Turner's Gap, Hood convinced Lee to allow him to withdraw his brigade from that position. At Antietam, Hood was among the commanders who attempted, but were unable to convince Lee to retreat on Sept. 18, the day after the battle. (Lee remained in Sharpsburg on Sept. 18, prepared to continue, withdrawing on Sept. 19 only after McClellan did not resume the battle.) At Gettysburg, Hood, possibly recalling his heavy casualties at Gaines's Mill a year earlier, and noting the similarity of the Union positions at Gaines's Mill and Little Round Top, requested permission of Longstreet for a flanking movement instead of a frontal assault. Hood's request to Longstreet was made, and denied, three times before Hood himself confronted Longstreet, protesting the frontal assault, only to be denied a fourth time.

All of Hood's four attacks on Sherman at Atlanta; Peachtree Creek, Decatur, Ezra Church and Jonesboro were to involve major Confederate flanking movements, and were tactically designed for assaults on the rear and flanks of the Federals.

Even during the ill-fated 1864 Tennessee Campaign, two days before the infamous assault at Franklin, Hood's forces, after seven days and 100 miles of hard marching, intercepted Schofield's Federals at Columbia, Tennessee. On November 28, Hood's forces confronted 15,000 of Schofield's troops, who had entrenched in Columbia in anticipation of an attack. Rather than attack these fortified defenses, Hood feigned an assault with one corps, and sent his two other corps on a flanking movement to Schofield's rear, in Spring Hill. With Schofield still 40 miles from reinforcements in Union-held Nashville, Hood had the luxury of a flanking attempt, an option that he would not have two days later at Franklin.

The only full frontal assault ever ordered by Hood as commander of the Army of Tennessee was the ill-fated assault at Franklin. There he had no other options if he was to follow his orders to attack and conquer Nashville. Schofield's 20,000 Federals were in the process of escaping across the Harpeth River and moving toward Nashville, only 15 miles to the north, when overtaken by Hood on the afternoon of Nov. 30, 1864. Any flanking movement would have required the fording of the Harpeth River and a march of several miles, with only 3 hours of daylight remaining during that time of year. Other than an immediate frontal charge at Franklin, Hood's only other option would have been to confront 40,000 Federals in more heavily fortified Nashville at a later time.

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Myth: Hood coldly sacrificed his men in combat.

Reality: In author R. E. L. Kreck's essay in "The 1862 Richmond Campaign," after the victorious assault at Gaines's Mill, "...a staff officer found the sturdy general in the darkness, 'sitting on a cracker box, crying.'" According to Chaplain Nicholas Davis, General Hood attended the next morning's roll call and was appalled that only a fraction of the men were present. "'Is this the Fourth Texas?' asked Hood. 'This is all that remains,' was the reply. Tears rolled down the general's cheeks as he rode away, and there was not a soldier in that line but what thought more of him now than ever before."

At Antietam, Richard O' Connor wrote in "Hood: Cavalier General," "...the sad-eyed Hood...wept as he told Lee of the hundreds of his Texans and Georgians who had fallen that day in the cornfield."

On the morning after the Battle of Franklin, as Hood was inspecting the battlefield, one of his soldiers recalled, " His sturdy visage assumed a melancholy appearance, and for a considerable time he sat on his horse and wept like a child."

Pvt. William Stanton, of the 6th Texas Infantry, Granbury's Brigade, Cleburne's Division, wrote to his cousin in Victoria TX on Jan. 17, 1865 that on the morning after the battle of Franklin Gen. Hood, upon learning of the death of Gen. Patrick Cleburne, "...took his cigar out of his mouth, lowered his head and wept for half an hour."
 
Private Sam Watkins visited Hood's tent for a furlough on the retreat from Nashville and wrote "I was at General Hood's headquarters. He was much agitated and affected, pulling his hair with his one hand (he had but one), and crying like his heart would break. I pitied him, poor fellow."

John Bell Hood knew first hand the terror and carnage of combat. Having been seriously wounded three times in battle, and losing half of his limbs, he appreciated and respected his soldiers who risked their lives for a patriotic cause, and grieved at their deaths and their suffering.

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Myth: Hood was a poor division and corps commander.

Reality: This rather ignorant assertion is frequently repeated, and evolved from the statement of one of Longstreet's staff officers, Thomas J. Goree who wrote, "Hood is a tolerable division commander, and a very poor corps commander."

How Goree could come to such a conclusion, and how brilliant historians and authors could embrace such a theory, rather than dissect it, is puzzling. Hood was promoted to major general after Antietam, his first division command, where his successful defense of the Confederate left, against overwhelming odds, is universally praised. Then at Fredericksburg, the defeat of General Burnside's Federals was so complete that Hood's division saw little action. His next division command was at Gettysburg, where Hood's severe wound ended his participation, 30 minutes after it had begun. His final division command was under Longstreet at Chickamauga, joining his new division only a few days before the battle, where he was again severely wounded on the second day, as his victorious division routed the Union XX Corps of Major General Alexander McCook. Hood was promoted to lieutenant general for his notable performance at Chickamauga.

To summarize, in command of a division in battle, Hood is remarkably successful at Antietam; spent zero minutes in combat at Fredericksburg; 30 minutes at Gettysburg; and smashes the opposing Federal brigades at Chickamauga. Yet Goree labels Hood only as a "tolerable" division commander, with many historians repeating that unflattering assessment with little inquiry as to its veracity.

Hood's only service as a corps commander was during the Dalton-to-Atlanta campaign under Johnston in the spring of 1864. In this campaign there were no significant offensive tactical movements whatsoever ordered by Johnston. Hood's corps (as were all of Johnston's corps) was used exclusively in defensive positions behind breastworks, enduring Union attacks. Few, if any, Confederate assaults were conducted during this period, rather, Confederate efforts were mostly limited to building defensive fortifications, abandoning them and retreating, then building more fortifications. If Hood was a "very poor corps commander," it could only have been attributable to some ineptitude at the construction of defensive fortifications, because tactically, that is essentially all his corps did between Dalton and Atlanta.

Rather than embrace the opinion of a relatively obscure character such as Goree, authors and historians could just as easily embrace the opinion of the acclaimed Confederate General John B. Gordon, who wrote: "As division or corps commander, there were few men in either army who were superior to Hood"

Many modern civil war historians and authors engage in in-depth analysis and interpretation, seeking to apply context and credibility to historical records. Some scholars analyze so deeply, and opine with such force, that they seem to have acquired clairvoyant powers, reading into the thoughts of long departed men of history. And often, as a result, sources that malign, impugn, insult, or condemn General Hood are accepted without critical analysis. Scholars often cynically discount the accuracy and credibility of any source or evidence that does not corroborate their prejudicial and subjective theories. The case of Goree's comments about John Bell Hood's division and corps command abilities is but one example of such conduct by civil war academia.

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Myth: Hood undermined Johnston during the Atlanta Campaign.

Reality: Hood did indeed communicate with Davis during the retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, but so did Johnston's other two corps commanders. On June 22, 1864, Johnston's trusted subordinate, close confidant and corps commander General William Hardee wrote to Jefferson Davis, "If the present system continues we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a serious battle is fought." Another of Johnston's corps commanders, General A. P. Stewart, wrote to Davis's military advisor Braxton Bragg on March 19, 1864, "Are we to hold still, remaining on the defensive in this position until (Sherman) comes down with his combined armies to drive us out?" Many historians, even critics of Hood, speculate that he was simply following Davis's order to keep him advised of Johnston's activities. Davis had been critical of Johnston's secrecy, and questioned Johnston's abilities, since the earliest weeks of the war.

Davis was critical of Johnston's premature abandonment of Harper's Ferry, risking the loss of valuable arms manufacturing equipment. Davis had criticized Johnston's hesitations at the Battle of First Manassas, attributing the independent actions of General Kirby Smith with saving the Confederates forces that had been imperiled by Johnston's inaction. In early 1862 Davis was displeased with Johnston's premature retreat from heavily fortified defensive positions around Centerville, Virginia, and the subsequent loss of artillery and supplies. Davis was also upset that Johnston commenced the retreat without advising the Confederate high command of the movement.

Johnston's forces were then transferred to the Virginia Peninsula to counter Federal forces then concentrating at Fortress Monroe. Again, Johnston commenced a retreat, prematurely in the opinion of Davis, and again without early notification to the Confederate War and Navy Secretaries. Johnston's later actions during the retreat again displeased Davis, who wrote, "General Johnston halted in his retreat near the Chickahominy, but after spending some days in selecting a position for defense against the advancing enemy, suddenly crossed that river without notice to the Government and retreated upon Richmond." In the ensuing battle around Richmond, Johnston was wounded, and replaced by Robert E. Lee. Davis wrote, "His wound...terminated his first important command, which he had administered in a manner to impair my confidence in his fitness to conduct a campaign..."

Upon Johnston's recovery from his wound, Davis assigned him to the departmental command of the Confederate armies in Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Davis commented, "...though my confidence in him had been much shaken, it had not yet been destroyed..." Here Davis would again regret his appointment of Johnston who refused to attack Grant at Vicksburg after being instructed to do so. Johnston also ignored instructions to attack Union General Banks at Port Hudson. In both events Johnston declined to attack, claiming that such movements would put Jackson, Mississippi at risk. Davis wrote "...both Vicksburg and Port Hudson had been captured without one blow on his part to relieve either...(then) no sooner had the enemy commenced investing Jackson than General Johnston pronounced it untenable...Jackson was evacuated, and General Johnston withdrew his army to eastern Mississippi." Davis again was highly annoyed by Johnston's persistent blatant secrecy, writing "...neither in this nor his previous command had it been possible for me to obtain from General Johnston any communications of his plans or purposes beyond vague statements..."

However, during the winter of 1863-1864 Davis "...yielded my convictions, and gave him a third trial..." and appointed Johnston to command of the Army of Tennessee, Confederate law allowing Robert E. Lee and Beauregard as the only other possible candidates. Davis also reorganized and reinforced Johnston's new command, transferring Leonidas Polk and the offensive-minded Hood to the Army of Tennessee.

During his convalescence of his Chickamauga wound in Richmond during the winter of 1863-1864, fellow Kentuckians Hood and Davis spent many hours together, developing a close personal friendship. It is virtually certain, given Davis's past experiences with Johnston, that Hood was instructed to keep Davis closely advised of Johnston's plans and activities in north Georgia. Although this surreptitious arrangement may be considered inappropriate, the fate of Atlanta, and the entire Confederacy was at stake, Davis certainly would have considered it his only alternative, given Johnston's propensity for retreat, and secrecy.

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Myth: Hood's offensive attacks around Atlanta were irrational.

Reality: When General Hood replaced General Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee on July 17, 1864, Union General Sherman had advanced southward toward Atlanta approximately 100 miles, in a period of 60 days. Much of the terrain in north Georgia yielded by Johnston was mountainous, and offered natural obstacles which could have complimented defensive fortifications, and exacerbated Sherman's difficulties to advance. However, Johnston, as he had done in Virginia in 1862, and in Mississippi in 1863, consistently retreated. Only after Johnston had allowed Sherman to within five miles of Atlanta did Jefferson Davis remove Johnston in favor of Hood.

Davis was desperately trying to deny Abraham Lincoln any significant and definitive military victories before the November, 1864 elections. Lincoln's opponent was anticipated to be the popular General George McClellan, whose Democrat Party advocated peace negotiations with the Confederacy. Davis hoped that war-weariness in the North would, as Larry E. Nelson wrote in "Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policy for the U. S. Presidential Contest of 1864," "...result in the election of a presidential candidate amenable to Confederate independence." The capitulation of Atlanta was a military victory that Davis did not want Lincoln's government to achieve.

The southern populace was equally adamant about the preservation of Atlanta. The Atlanta Appeal newspaper, declaring that retreating must cease and attacks must be launched, wrote in an editorial immediately after Hood's appointment to command of the Army of Tennessee, "There is a limit to prudence. When excessive, our enemies denominate it cowardice. This war must end and the final battle be fought. Why not here, and even now?" The Augusta Constitutionalist newspaper wrote on July 20, 1864, regarding Hood's replacement of Johnston, "If it means anything it must mean this: Atlanta will not be given up without a fight."

Johnston's exclusively defensive tactics yielded 100 mile in 60 days. Hood's tactics involved attacking at opportune times, otherwise defending, and succeeded in holding off Sherman for 45 days at the gates of Atlanta. None of Hood's four major assaults succeeded in crushing Sherman and saving Atlanta. However, they were best described by Union Major General James H. Wilson, who wrote in his post war memoirs "Under the Old Flag" that Hood's campaigns "...were ably planned and needed nothing but heavier battalions, greater resources, and better subordinates to make them successful."

Confederate Gen. William Bate, who commanded a division under Johnston and then Hood, wrote to Gen. Braxton Bragg on Aug. 23, 1864, "We still hold Atlanta and I think under the present regime will continue to do so. The movements and fights of the 20th and 22nd and the intended sequel to that of the 28th of July were well conceived and exhibited a high order of military ability on the part of General Hood."

According to author Stephen Davis in "Atlanta Will Fall," various Civil War historians and authors have praised the ingenuity of many of Hood's strategies and tactics.  For example, Hood's plans at the Battle of Peachtree Creek are described by historian Stanley Horn as "brilliant in its conception. There seems no doubt that the maneuver completely befuddled Sherman."  Albert Castel described Hood's plan as "worthy of Lee," offering the promise of "the most spectacular victory of the war."  Even Irving Buck, General Patrick Cleburne's adjutant, wrote, "General Hood had conceived a move worthy of Stonewall Jackson, in attempting to strike and crush Sherman's left wing in a flanking movement."

Regarding Hood's spirited and determined defense of Atlanta, Stephen Davis concludes: "President Davis feared that the city's fall was inevitable, but that he was determined that it should not fall without a manly struggle.  This fierce, manly struggle General Hood gave (Jefferson) Davis and the Confederacy, as well as the Yankees themselves.  In this way, Hood lived up to the country's expectations. Thus, in his test of merit, he served the South admirably.  By this view, Hood should not be blamed for the outcome of the campaign (the fall of Atlanta); he had accepted the chances of the city's fall on July 18 and he struggled to prevent it.  He did everything in his power to prevent it and in doing so acted very heroically."

I) Peachtree Creek:

On July 19 Hood received intelligence that Federal forces, then maneuvering around the perimeter of Atlanta, had split, with General George Thomas's corps being situated several miles west of the two corps of McPherson and Schofield. Hood found this a rare opportunity for Confederate forces to attack with the advantage of numerical superiority, Thomas's Army of the Cumberland only totaling approximately 18,000 troops. More importantly, at that time Thomas was beginning the process of crossing Peachtree Creek, and his forces would be vulnerable.

Hood quickly devised a plan to attack Thomas immediately after his forces completed their crossing of Peachtree Creek, but before they could finish construction of their entrenchments and defensive fortifications. His plan was to drive the Federals back down Peachtree Creek to the confluence with the Chattahoochee River, in the opposite direction of McPherson and Schofield, entrapping Thomas without an escape route, and without support of other Federal forces several miles away.

Hardee's Corps would be the key to the success of the battle, and would have an almost three to one numerical advantage over the Federal IV Corps. The remaining Confederate forces under A. P. Stewart would be numerically inferior to the Federal XX Corps, but their role would be less critical than Hardee's.

As the battle began, the Federal forces were indeed caught in a vulnerable position, but Hardee's attack lacked coordination, only committing about one third of his forces against the Federals. The Confederate attack ultimately failed, with Hardee's forces withdrawing back into their breastworks. In his book "Decision in the West," author Albert Castel blames the Confederate failure at Peachtree Creek on Hardee's poor coordination, and the "half hearted" performance of several of his regiments. Stewart's forces performed well, but lacked adequate numbers of troops. In summary, Castel writes, "In brief, where the Confederates had the advantage in strength, they did not fight well; and where they fought well, they were too weak. And because they did not fight well enough where they were strong enough, they lost. This in essence is the story of Peachtree Creek."

Both Federal and Confederate losses were approximately 10% of the forces engaged at Peachtree Creek; 1,900 Federals and 2,500 Confederates were killed, wounded and captured. The 10% Confederate losses at Peachtree Creek were substantially lower than the 23% average casualty rate for Confederate troops in the twelve largest civil war battles, according to authors Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson's "Attack and Die: Confederate Casualties and the War Effort."

II) Decatur (a.k.a. Bald Hill, a.k.a. Atlanta):

On July 21 McPherson's Union forces moved onto "Bald Hill," only two miles east of Atlanta, launching a howitzer bombardment of the city. He had also moved within striking distance of the Macon and Western railroad, Hood's only remaining supply line. Hood soon learned from his cavalry commander General "Fighting Joe" Wheeler, that McPherson's left (southeast) flank had become exposed, and that a large number of Federal supply wagons were situated in McPherson's rear, near Decatur. Hood viewed this as an opportunity to save the Macon railroad, end the bombardment of Atlanta, and destroy or capture McPherson's supplies. Furthermore, McPherson's forces, although in close proximity to Schofield, were still separated from Thomas's forces located immediately north of Atlanta.

Hood's plan was to commit 30,000 Confederate troops, virtually all available Confederate forces in Atlanta, on a bold attack whose success would depend on a long night march by Hardee's forces to the rear of McPherson, with an attack at daylight. Ultimately the attack would fail, due in large part to the understandable fatigue of Hardee's troops, which did not succeed in reaching the Federal rear before daylight on the morning of July 22. Due to straggling, only about two thirds of Hardee's troops were able to participate in the attack. Hardee's troops suffered fatigue and exhaustion from their participation in the earlier battle at Peachtree Creek, with many Confederates having not slept in three days.

Federal losses totaled 3,700. Confederate losses were approximately 5,500, or about 15% of the combatants. However, the railroad remained open, and Atlanta remained in Confederate hands.

Hood had expected too much from his fatigued troops. As Castel states, "he tried to do too much with too little in too short a time." However, the threat to the last remaining rail line, and the bombardment of civilians in Atlanta, were compelling reasons for Hood to attempt decisive measures.

III) Ezra Church:

In the early morning hours of July 28 Hood learned that Federal forces had withdrawn from positions to the southeast, indicating that the threat to the Macon railroad had subsided. Major General Oliver Howard's Union forces were maneuvering to the west of Atlanta and Hood anticipated the greatest threat to be from that area.

Hood promptly took countermeasures, designed to attack the Federals before they could entrench in their new positions. General Stephen D. Lee, who had arrived from Mississippi only a day earlier and assumed command of Hood's old corps, was to immediately move two divisions into position along Lick Skillet Road to block the Union advance. General A. P. Stewart was to move two divisions out of fortifications on Atlanta's northeast side and march down Lick Skillet Road, in the rear of Lee's division, to a point beyond the Federals' right flank, and attack the Federals from the right and rear. Hood's flanking plan was attempting to do what the Army of Tennessee was unable to do at Decatur. However this time Hood would assign the heavy fighting task to Stewart's troops, who had performed magnificently at Peachtree Creek on July 20th. And unlike the problem at Decatur, ample time for the flanking march was provided...a full 24 hours. Finally, Hood had assigned the entire operation to two commanders, Stewart and Lee, who unlike Hardee (as Hood opined,) believed in aggressive tactics.

As the plan unfolded, Lee's forces moved into position and engaged the Federals one half mile north of Lick Skillet Road. As Stewart's divisions came into position, moving behind Lee along the road toward the Federal right flank, Lee approached Stewart and suggested that Hood had changed the plan, and Stewart's troops were to immediately attack to the left of Lee's divisions. Hood had not changed the plan, and instead of Stewart's divisions continuing for another mile before attacking the Federal right and rear, Lee had convinced Stewart to immediately join in his attack.

The Federals easily repulsed the Confederate attack, and inflicted over 3,000 casualties, while suffering only 600 Union casualties. Castel writes in "Decision in the West," "Historians will blame Hood for this slaughter. The true culprit is Stephen Lee. Disregarding his instructions and ignoring subsequent orders, he attempted to crush Sherman's supposedly vulnerable right flank with impromptu and disjointed attacks by his own and Stewart's troops long after the failure of the first one demonstrated that they had no chance of success - the exact duplicate of his conduct two weeks earlier in Tupelo, from which experience he obviously learned nothing. What he should have done is what Hood had directed him to do-simply keep open the Lick Skillet Road for the passage of Stewart's forces..."

The Battle of Ezra Church was yet another attack by Hood, designed to assault the Federals before they could entrench, and attack the flanks and rear with superior numbers. The carnage at Ezra Church was a result not of Hood's, but of his subordinates tactics. Confederate casualties totaled 3,000, about 15% of the troops engaged.

IV) Battle of Jonesboro:

After the severe setback at Ezra Church, Hood's defenders did achieve some successes. Sherman sent a large contingent of Union cavalry under Brigadier General Edward McCook and Major General George Stoneman on a raid to cut Hood's remaining railroad lifeline to the south, and to then possibly move on to Andersonville and release the thousands of Federal prisoners. On July 31 and August 1 McCook's cavalry was routed by General Joe Wheeler at Brown's Mill, south of Atlanta, while Stoneman and most of his cavalry were captured at Sunshine Church by Confederate forces under Brigadier General Alfred Iverson. With these losses, two thirds of Sherman's entire cavalry was destroyed. Then, on August 5 and 6 a Federal movement at Utoy Creek was repulsed by Confederate defenders.

However, on August 29 an impatient Sherman began another movement to the south of Atlanta intended to cut the vital Macon railroad. Federal forces under General Howard succeeded in reaching positions only 600 yards from the Macon and Western Railroad depot at Jonesboro, 15 miles south of Atlanta. With Federal artillery then in a position to bombard the railroad facilities, Hood ordered an attack by Hardee's corps, and planned to commence the assault before the Federals could construct defenses. Hardee's troops would again have numerical superiority, and attempt an assault on the right flank of Major General John Logan's Federals. Hood was confident of forcing the Federals away, alleviating the threat to the railroad. However, as had occurred in virtually every Confederate attack, troops were late in arriving into positions. Major General Patrick Cleburne's division took almost 12 hours to travel 12 miles, and S. D. Lee's forces arrived late, and exhausted. According to Castel, " (Lee's) troops have had little sleep for two nights, they have marched from twelve to fifteen miles...many are shoeless and footsore, all are half exhausted and hungry, and hundreds have dropped out along the way, unable or unwilling to keep going."

As the battle began, the Confederate assault, as usual, became uncoordinated. S. D. Lee, as Castel explains, was again at the center of the problems. "At 3 P.M. ...Cleburne's skirmishers start forward. Lee, displaying the same aggressive spirit and talent for blundering that he revealed at Tupelo and Ezra Church, mistakes their fire for the beginning of Cleburne's assault. At once he commands his corps to charge." Castel continues, "Meanwhile Cleburne's attack gets under way and almost immediately degenerates into farcical chaos."

The Battle of Jonesboro was a Union victory, sealing the fate of Atlanta when Howard's troops took positions only 600 yards from the railroad depot on the only remaining rail line into Atlanta. Hood was compelled to act. His tactical plans called for a flank attack, and his troop movements succeeded in giving the Confederates a numerical advantage. Even with approximately three-fourths of the total Confederate forces in the Atlanta area committed, the attack failed. Confederate losses were approximately 2,200, about 14% of the troops engaged, again well below the 23% average for all civil war battles.

After the fall of Atlanta, President Jefferson Davis wrote to Georgia Senator Herschel V. Johnson on Sept. 18, 1864, "No one was more anxious than myself to prevent the fall of Atlanta; I was not among those who deemed that result inevitable as soon as the enemy had crossed the Chattahoochie [sic], and I was not willing that it should be yielded before manly blows should be struck for its preservation."

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Myth: Hood's invasion of Tennessee was Quixotic and dillusional.

Reality: Jefferson Davis wrote in his post-war memoirs of the desire of the Confederate government to recover Tennessee in early 1864. In criticizing Joseph Johnston he wrote: "...General (Joseph) Johnston entered upon his third command - that of the army designed to recover the State of Tennessee from the enemy. In February, 1864, he was informed of the policy of the Government for his army. It was proposed to reinforce him largely, and that he should advance at once and assume the recovery of at least a part of the State of Tennessee."

After the fall of Atlanta, Davis visited the Army of Tennessee in Palmetto, Georgia on Sept. 26, 1864, and told the troops, "Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing Tennessee soil." Then the following week, while in Augusta, Georgia, Davis was quoted in the October 4 issue of the Augusta Constitutionalist newspaper as alluding to the Army of Tennessee "treading Tennessee soil" and "pushing on to the Ohio."

After the evacuation of Atlanta in early September, 1864, the Army of Tennessee harassed Sherman's supply and communications lines north of Atlanta. However, Sherman abandoned Atlanta and began his "March to the Sea," attacking Savannah, Charleston, Columbia and Wilmington. With Sherman heading southeast, destroying in his wake bridges, crops, livestock and other subsistence sources, Hood, being to the northwest of Atlanta, realized it would be impossible to overtake Sherman's 275 mile head start. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate War Department, and Hood's immediate superior P. G. T. Beauregard decided that an invasion of Tennessee would be the mission of the Army of Tennessee. General P. G. T. Beauregard's Dec. 6, 1864 letter to Jefferson Davis clearly details the reasons for Hood's Tennessee invasion:

Augusta, Georgia, Dec. 6, 1864

To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States.

...I did not countermand the campaign in Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:

1st. The Roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa river across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and the wagon trains.

2nd. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start about two hundred seventy five miles on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.

3rd. To pursue Sherman, the passage of the Army of Tennessee would, necessarily, have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage; and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.

4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Thomas's force the richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

...Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.

I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant.
P. G. T. Beauregard, General.

Army of Tennessee Chaplain Dr. Charles Quitard wrote in his diary on Nov. 28, 1864, “General Beauregard telegraphs General Hood that Sherman is making his way rapidly to the Atlantic Coast and urges him to press forward so as to relieve General Lee.” Critics of Gen. Hood say that Hood's comments in his memoirs about marching through the Cumberland Gap to relieve Robert E. Lee was at worst false and at be dillusional.

As the Tennessee Campaign was proceeding, Jefferson Davis and Beauregard corresponded extensively, and on Nov. 30 Davis wired Beauregard, "Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely change Grant’s or Sherman’s campaigns."

Davis wrote in his post-war memoirs, "Hood had served with distinction under Lee and Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army...we should never have heard complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes with which he made his assault."

In a letter to Jefferson Davis dated December 25, 1864, Tennessee Governor Isham Harris, who had accompanied Hood on the invasion wrote, "I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or neglected anything that he should have done which it was possible to do. Indeed, the more that I have seen and known of him and his policy, the more I have been pleased with him and regret to say that if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results would have been very different."

General S. D. Lee wrote in his Official Report on Jan. 30, 1865, commenting on the disposition of the Army of Tennessee after the Atlanta Campaign, "It was my opinion that the Army should take up the offensive, with the hope that favorable opportunities would be offered for striking the enemy successfully, thus ensuring the efficiency of the Army for future operations."

General A. P. Stewart wrote afterward, "I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications."

Union Gen. James H. Wilson wrote in his memoirs Under the Old Flag Vol. II (p. 28-30)   “Fortunately for us, Hood lost a whole month at Gadsden, waiting for ammunition, supplies and recruits, while Forrest was making a senseless raid toward the Cumberland River.  It was this delay and this raid…that gave Thomas time to assemble all his forces for a sturdy defense…Had Hood advanced at once with his three corps of infantry and his cavalry in better condition, he must have overthrown Thomas and overrun both Tennessee and Kentucky.”xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

The 1864 Tennessee Campaign was purely a military and political war operation.

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Myth: Hood attacked at Franklin out of anger.

Reality: On the morning of November 30, 1864, after learning of Schofield's escape from Spring Hill during the previous night, a Confederate staff officer wrote that Hood was "wrathy as a rattlesnake." He had set in motion the perfect maneuver to trap Schofield's corps, one of the few opportunities of the entire war to cut off and capture an entire army. In his postwar memoirs (Under the Old Flag, Vol. II) Union Gen. James H. Wilson described the flanking movement around Schofield; "His (Hood's) plan was brilliant, and so obviously proper that Schofield should have divined it from the start." Hood probably was angry at the failure, and had every right to be.

Hood was not the only Confederate general to be angry at the lost opportunity at Spring Hill. John Copley of the 49th Tennessee described the outrage of Nathan Bedford Forrest in his 1893 book, A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin, with Reminiscences of Camp Douglass. Copley wrote: "When we discovered their successful escape on the morning of the 30th, our chagrin and disappointment can be better imagined than described. General Forrest was so enraged that his face turned almost to a chalky whiteness, and his lips quivered. He cursed out some of the commanding officers, and censured them for allowing the Federal army to escape. I looked at him, as he sat in his saddle pouring forth his volumes of wrath, and was almost thunderstruck to listen to him, and to see no one dare resent it."

Although the specifics surrounding the failure at Spring Hill have remained a mystery for over one hundred and thirty five years, what is undeniable is that Hood gave multiple orders to cut off the retreat of Schofield's forces, and the orders were not carried out. As Commanding General, Hood is held by many to be ultimately responsible for vague or misdirected orders, not being present on the field, or not staying abreast of the situation as it developed. In retrospect, those may be true, but the fact that he was shocked at learning of the escape of the Union Army on the morning of Nov. 30, reveals that he had fully expected them to have been entrapped by the Confederates at daybreak. He had entrusted that responsibility to his general staff, and rightfully expected them to see that it was carried out. His anger would have been a natural result of the loss of what he later termed as "the best move of my career."

Notwithstanding his demeanor at daybreak on November 30, contemporary sources describe Hood as composed later in the day.

Army of Tennessee veteran Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham, writing in the April, 1893 issue of 'Confederate Veteran' magazine, stood near to Hood on Winstead Hill overlooking Franklin as Hood contemplated the attack on the afternoon of Nov. 30, 1864. Cunningham wrote. "While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines." Cunningham continued "...but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge."

In an article in the May 3, 1902 edition of the Atlanta Journal newspaper, Army of Tennessee veteran Dr. W. T. Burt, formerly of the 46th Georgia Infantry, quoted from his wartime diary of Hood's final orders at Franklin, "General Hood's last words to his generals were: 'Now, go down to the work to be done and go at it'." These are hardly the irrational rantings of an enraged commander; rather an exhortation intending to inspire a determined effort.

There is no known written historical record that describes Hood in a state of anger at 2:00 P.M. on the afternoon of Nov. 30, 1864. To the contrary, all historical records clearly describe Hood as composed, focused and professional prior to the Franklin attack

At Franklin, Hood was attempting to engage Schofield's 20,000 Federals before they reached Nashville to combine with Thomas's 20,000 additional troops. As Hood looked out upon Franklin from Winstead Hill, he could see the panic of the Federals. Cunningham wrote "The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville." Hood knew that by morning Schofield's entire army would be inside heavily fortified Nashville, only 15 miles from Franklin. Hood was sent into Tennessee by the Confederate government to conquer Nashville, and if he did not attack Schofield's 20,000 troops on the afternoon of Nov. 30, 1864, he would have to attack the Federals in much more heavily fortified Nashville at a later date. His choices were to attack a numerically inferior Federal force immediately at Franklin, attack a numerically superior force at more heavily fortified Nashville, or abandon the campaign.

Gen. John Schofield wrote in his memoir, "Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so able a general as J.E. Johnston has characterized it as ‘useless butchery'. These criticisms are based on a misapprehension of the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been aware of our relative weakness of numbers at Franklin, and of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30 or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides our position with the river on our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary. The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost."

Battle of Franklin veteran, Washington Gardner, later a U.S. Congressman from Michigan, wrote of Gen. Hood in Henry Field's book, Bright Skies and Dark Shadows, "By the way, I was somewhat surprised, and may say pained, during my recent trip South, to note the disposition among soldiers of the late Confederate Army to criticize and disparage the merits of Gen. Hood. That he made mistakes no unprejudiced student of the War Between the States will deny, but that he was possessed of some of the best qualities that belong to great military commanders is equally indisputable. As between the General and his critics touching the Battle of Franklin, my sympathies are entirely with the former; while my admiration for the splendid valor exhibited by his heroic legions on that bloody field is not diminished by the fact that they were Americans all, Franklin, from the Confederate standpoint of view, must ever remain one of the saddest tragedies of the Civil War; on the other hand, there were in that battle possibilities to the Confederate cause, and that came near being realized, scarcely second to those of any other in the great conflict. Had Hood won -- and he came within an ace of it -- and reaped the legitimate fruits of his victory, the verdict of history would have been reversed, and William T. Sherman, who took the flower of his army and with it made an unobstructed march to the sea, leaving but a remnant to contend against a foe that had taxed his every resource from Chattanooga to Atlanta, would have been called at the close as at the beginning of the war, 'Crazy Sherman.' No individual, not even Hood himself, had so much at stake at Franklin as the hero of the 'march to the sea.'"

Col. Virgil S. Murphey of the 17th Alabama Infantry, who was captured at Franklin, wrote in his diary, "Had Hood succeeded, Nashville would have opened her gates to the head of his victorious legions and the throat of Tennessee released from the grasp of remorseless despotism. It was worth the hazard. Its failure does not diminish the value of the prize."

Commenting on the escape of the Union army at Spring Hill, Murphey wrote, "The same blow (as at Franklin) delivered with equal power at Spring Hill or Thompson's Station would have yielded us dominion over Tennessee. A failure to obey an order lost us a noble commonwealth." Murphey added that Hood recognized the perilous position of the Federals at Spring Hill, and stated that "a grave responsibility rested upon the general who failed to make the attack as we knew our advantage and Hood had ordered the attack."

Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, "In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center -- involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains -- only fordable by infantry at one or two places -- and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds -- a vastly superior force -- in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation." Simmons added that the Federals quickly withdrew to Nashville after the battle as Franklin was "untenable." He also stated that with Schofield's corps absent from Nashville, the city was "scantily protected."

With the plight of the Confederacy so precarious that Lee indeed surrendered 18 weeks later, Hood chose to attack at Franklin, the only frontal assault against fortified positions that he ever ordered as an independent commander.

Although it is quite appropriate to disagree with Hood's decision at Franklin, it is simply inaccurate to conclude that the attack was ordered by Hood for any reasons other than strategic and tactical military considerations.

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Myth: Hood's movement on Nashville after Franklin was irrational.

Reality: At West Point, all cadets, including Hood, were taught Napoleon's Military Maxims. In nineteenth century warfare, these were considered to be the most fundamental of military tactics. Napoleon's Maxim Number 6 states "When once the offensive has been assumed, it must be assumed to the last extremity. However skillful he maneuvers, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy."

Franklin was, by the definition of that time, technically a Confederate victory, since Schofield yielded the field to Hood and retreated. Although Hood knew that his casualties were high at Franklin, he also knew that he had inflicted substantial casualties on Schofield as well. (Historians frequently list only 179 Union killed at Franklin, versus 1,700 Confederates. However, due to Schofield's frantic overnight retreat to Nashville, most Union dead were left at Franklin. Official Union reports listed over 1,000 as "missing" at Franklin, presumably killed in action. As of December, 2005, ongoing research has identified approximately 700 Union soldiers killed at Franklin.) Immediately following the battle of Franklin, Hood proceeded on to Nashville, constructing heavy defensive fortifications, including redoubts, with hopes of enticing Thomas to attack. Hood concluded that an assault by Thomas on heavy defensive fortifications could cripple the Federals, and a successful Confederate counterattack could then be launched.

In their criticisms of Hood's movement on Nashville, authors and scholars seldom reveal that after the Battle of Franklin, Hood immediately requested that P.G.T. Beauregard contact Richmond and seek reinforcements or a strategic intervention by Confederate Gen. Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi. On Dec. 2, Beauregard wired Jefferson Davis, "Cannot I send Gen. E. Kirby Smith to reinforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee?" Beauregard further asked that if logistics prohibited troops from crossing the Union-controlled Mississippi River, could Kirby Smith launch an offensive into Missouri, thus keeping Union Gen. A. J. Smith's Federal forces in St. Louis from reinforcing Thomas at Nashville. Receiving no reply, Beauregard again wrote to Kirby Smith, as did Confederate Secretary of War Seddon, but it was not until January 6, after the decisive Battle of Nashville, that Smith replied, stating that he could provide no assistance. Hood also requested reinforcements from other areas, specifically Breckinridge in western Virginia, and troops from Mobile. Both requests were denied by Richmond.

General U. S. Grant was so concerned with the threat of Hood's army outside of Nashville that he ordered Thomas to attack on Dec. 6. Then on Dec. 11, with Thomas still having not attacked Hood, Grant telegraphed Thomas "If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio..." In fact, Grant left his army in Virginia and was actually en route to Nashville to personally supervise an attack by Thomas's forces on December 15th when he learned of Thomas's assault, telegraphing Thomas at 11:30 PM, "I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of today, I shall go no further."

Nashville was vital to the Union military effort in the western theater, and Hood's threat was so serious that Grant felt compelled to personally direct operations in its defense.

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Myth: The Army of Tennessee was destroyed at Franklin and Nashville.

Reality: This is perhaps the most fallacious of the hyperbolic, sensational superlatives which revisionist authors and historians attempt to create in the Civil War history community.

Ascertaining accurate Confederate troop statistics late in the war has proven to be extremely difficult, especially with the Army of Tennessee. Upon his dismissal in July, 1864, General Johnston's enraged Chief of Staff, W. W. Mackall, abruptly resigned, and departed for home, taking much of the army's administrative records with him. Records after the Tennessee Campaign were more credible than the post-Atlanta records, but still somewhat incomplete and confusing.

The Army of Tennessee commenced the invasion of Tennessee on November 21, 1864 with troop strength of 33,300 infantry, artillery and cavalry. Upon arrival in Tupelo, Mississippi in early January 1865 after it's retreat from Nashville, records show a troop strength 20,700. Thus, Confederate losses incurred during the Tennessee Campaign were approximately 12,700 or 37%. Many of the Confederate troops captured at Nashville were among the scores who witnesses described as having voluntarily surrendered, understandably tired of four years of suffering and deprivation. Among the memoirists was Private Sam Watkins' account in "Company Aytch." Although certainly exaggerating, Watkins wrote, "...more than ten thousand had stopped and allowed themselves to be captured." Other accounts recall entire companies of Confederates surrendering. Scores of Confederate troops, starving and freezing in the cold December weather, simply gave up. Although General Hood, as army commander, is ultimately responsible for subsistence, it can be reasonably assumed that had the Confederate government and high command been able to provide even minimal food and clothing, most Confederates would not have opted for the relative comfort of a Federal prison.

Notwithstanding this, still some 20,700 troops arrived in Tupelo, Mississippi in late December, 1864. Hood soon resigned, and furloughs were granted to large numbers of soldiers. In early 1865, with the hopes of the Confederacy fading, and the beleaguered Robert E. Lee soon surrendering at Appomattox, several thousand troops of the Army of Tennessee were transferred to North Carolina, and several thousand sent to Mobile, Alabama.

Is it ever contended that Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was "destroyed" in its final campaign of the war? In an April 10, 1865 letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee detailed the manpower situation with the Army of Northern Virginia on its final retreat to Appomattox. Lee wrote, "At the commencement of the withdrawal of the army from the lines on the night of the 2d, it began to disintegrate, and straggling from the ranks increased up to the surrender on the 9th. On that day, as previously reported, there were only seven thousand eight hundred and ninety-two (7892) effective infantry. During the night, when the surrender became known, more than ten thousand men came in, as reported to me by the Chief Commissary of the Army. During the succeeding days stragglers continued to give themselves up, so that on the 12th April, according to the rolls of those paroled, twenty-six thousand and eighteen (26,018) officers and men had surrendered. Men who had left the ranks on the march, and crossed James River, returned and gave themselves up, and many have since come to Richmond and surrendered."

If the same logic and statistical interpretations were applied to Robert E. Lee that are often applied to Hood's Tennessee Campaign, it should be asserted that since only 8,000 troops were on hand at Appomattox, from an army that began the final campaign with 26,000, the Army of Northern Virginia was thus "destroyed" prior to the surrender. Lee lost approximately 70% of his troops on his final campaign including deserters, stragglers, and surrenders, but it has never been written or spoken that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was ever "destroyed."

Chief Surgeon Dr. Samuel Mims Thompson of the 41st Tennessee wrote after the war, "It is true that we were sadly repulsed at Nashville. But he (Hood) brought off the larger portion of the army with Quartermaster, Commissary, Medical and Ordnance trains'"

Although the Army of Tennessee never engaged in another major military campaign after Nashville (the war only continued for five more months, three months of which were during the usual inactive winter camp period,) to say that it was destroyed at Franklin or Nashville is, by definition, impossible. If the army was "destroyed" at Franklin, how could it have been defeated two weeks later in Nashville? And if destroyed at Franklin, who inflicted 2,700 casualties on Thomas's attacking Union army at Nashville? If the army was "destroyed" at Nashville, how could it have successfully retreated to Mississippi?

Hood's army was decisively defeated in Tennessee, but not destroyed there. The Army of Tennessee, The Army of Northern Virginia, and all other Southern armies, like the Confederate States of America itself, were destroyed by four years of death, destruction and deprivation at the hands of a larger, stronger, resolute opponent.

Furthermore, an analysis of casualty rates in the major civil war battles indicates that the casualties incurred during the 1864 Tennessee Campaign, although high, do not deviate drastically from other Confederate losses. According to "Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage," by Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson, the total number of killed, wounded, and missing in the thirty largest civil war battles from First Manassas through Chickamauga were 225,790 out of 981,225 engaged, or 23%. Some Confederate casualty rates in notable battles include Shiloh (24.1%); Antietam (22.6%); Murfreesboro (26.6%); Chickamauga (25.6); and Gettysburg (30.2%). Although the troops captured at Nashville who actually surrendered make an accurate analysis difficult, the killed, wounded, and reasonably modified captured numbers for the entire Tennessee Campaign would probably be only slightly higher than many other major Civil War campaigns.

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Myth: Hood blamed others for the failure of the Tennessee Campaign.

Reality:  General Hood privately and publically accepted responsibility for the failure of the Tennessee Campaign.

Certain Civil War scholars and historians over the years, in researching the events that surround the Battle of Franklin, have expressed the peculiar view that Hood blamed the Confederate defeat at Franklin on the supposed aversion of the soldiers to attack fortified defenses,a theory unsupported by the historical record.

Hood indeed wrote in his memoirs that the Army of Tennessee, due to Joseph Johnston's tactics of "timid defense" during the Atlanta Campaign, had become unaccustomed to offensive warfare, and thus reluctant to fight without the protection of breastworks. Knowing their courageous record earlier in the war, Hood therefore deemed it of absolute necessity to purge them of this uncharacteristic trait, hoping to recover their aggressive fighting spirit.

The quote from Hood's posthumously published memoirs, "Advance and Retreat," that raises the ire of Hood's critics and detractors, states, "The best move of my career as a soldier, I was thus destined to behold come to naught. The discovery that the army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil." Hood was alluding to the Spring Hill (TN) affair, where Hood's successful flanking movement around Columbia, TN, "came to naught" after his orders to block the road of the retreating Federals was not fulfilled by his subordinate generals, allowing Union Gen. Schofield's forces to escape overnight to Franklin. These are Hood's words that are misinterpreted as "blaming" the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee for the loss at Franklin.

Additionally, Hood had sensed a deteriorating morale and enthusiasm with the soldiers themselves. However, reading his book in its entirety, not just one single paragraph, indicates that Hood clearly blamed the growing dispiritedness of the army, not on its soldiers, but squarely on the shoulders of its previous commander, Joseph E. Johnston, whose constant retreats had, in Hood's opinion, demoralized the army. Hood's corps commander, Gen. Stephen D. Lee, who joined the Army of Tennessee after Joseph Johnston's removal, described the army's reluctance to attack, "As a corps commander, I regarded the morale of the army greatly impaired after the fall of Atlanta, and in fact before its fall, the troops were not by any means in good spirits." " 'the majority of the officers and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks, that when orders were given for attack, and there was a probability of encountering works' they did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always assures success." (O.R. Series I, XXXIX, part 1, 810.)

John Bell Hood was not the only Confederate commander to observe a diminished spirit in his troops late in the war. On April 10, 1865, after the surrender at Appomattox, Gen. Robert E. Lee wrote in a letter to Jefferson Davis, "The operations which occurred while the troops were in the entrenchments in front of Richmond and Petersburg were not marked by the boldness and decision which formerly characterized them. Except in particular instances, they were feeble; and a want of confidence seemed to possess officers and men." No reasonable person would ever misinterpret Gen. Lee's words as blaming the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia for the loss of Richmond, Petersburg, and the war, yet such a misinterpretation is precisely what occurs with startling regularity by critics and detractors of Hood.

On page 311 his postwar memoirs, "Advance and Retreat", Hood wrote of the Tennessee Campaign, "...that I alone was responsible..." And in an effort to deflect criticisms away from his superiors Beauregard and Davis, Hood further wrote that the Tennessee Campaign was "my own conception", even though Beauregard had approved Hood's invasion concept, and stated so in a letter to Davis on Dec. 6, 1864. Davis' own desire for an offensive movement into Tennessee is well documented in newspaper accounts of Davis' public addresses in Palmetto, Georgia on Sept. 26, 1864 and Augusta, Georgia on Oct. 4, 1864. Hood not only accepted blame for his actions, but took the blame of others by voluntarily claiming full responsibility for certain unpopular decisions made by his superiors.

However, the campaign to liberate their home state had inspired the Army of Tennessee, and their heroic performance at Franklin was duly noted by Hood. Regarding the efforts of the Confederate soldiers at The Battle of Franklin, Hood offered in his postwar writings, not blame or criticism, but quite the opposite. Rather, Hood compared the courage and gallantry of the Army of Tennessee at Franklin to the famous victory of Hood's renowned Texas Brigade at Gaines' Mill in June of 1862, where newly appointed Army of Northern Virginia commander Robert E. Lee earned his first victory, breaking the siege of Richmond and saving the Confederate capital. Hood subsequently wrote in "Advance and Retreat,"...

"The attack (at Franklin) which entailed so great a sacrifice of life, had become a necessity as imperative as that which impelled General Lee to order the assault at Gaines' Mill, when our troops charged across an open space, a distance of one mile, under a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, against an enemy heavily entrenched. The heroes in that action fought not more gallantly than the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee upon the fields of Franklin. "

It is utterly fallacious to assert that John Bell Hood blamed the defeat at Franklin on the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. Rather, he bestowed upon them the highest of praise and admiration by comparing their incredible courage and resolve with one of the most celebrated Confederate victories, Gaines' Mill, earned by arguably the best soldiers of the Confederate Army, the immortal Texas Brigade. Also concealed are Hood's high praise of the soldiers in his Official Report, "Never did troops fight more gallantly." and "When the fortunes of war were against us, the same faithful (Army of Tennessee) soldiers remained true to their flag, and with rare exceptions followed it in retreat as they had borne it in advance." Hood is also criticized for not accepting responsibility for the failures of the campaign. Hood's detractors fail to reveal that he wrote in his memoirs, "Whilst I failed utterly to bring battle at Spring Hill..." and also wrote of the Tennessee Campaign in his farewell address after resigning command of the Army of Tennessee, "I am alone responsible for its conception..."

Near the end of the Nashville retreat, at Shoal Creek AL, W.G. Davenport of the 6th Texas Cavalry wrote that Gen Hood rode up and "Looking worn and tired but with kindly words for all, said to the soldiers, 'Boys, this is all my fault.'"

Hood was a close personal friend of South Carolina socialite Mary Chesnut, whose journal, the acclaimed "Diary From Dixie," mentions Hood frequently. After his resignation as commander of the Army of Tennessee, he visited the Chesnut home in April, 1865 and she wrote of Hood, "How plainly he (Hood) spoke out these dreadful words....He said he had nobody to blame but himself."

In the diary of Dr. Charles Quintard, Chaplain at Large of the Army of Tennessee during the Tennessee Campaign, Quintard wrote of a discussion with Gen. Hood on Dec. 18 during the retreat from Nashville. In regard to the affair at Spring Hill, Quintard wrote that Gen. Hood stated, "...the enemy was completely within our grasp, and not withstanding all his efforts to strike a decisive blow, he had failed."

Hood assumed responsibility for the failure of the Tennessee Campaign and could not have complimented the Army of Tennessee any higher.

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Myth: Hood was unpopular with the Army of Tennessee troops.

Reality: Hood was, like many commanders of many armies throughout the history of warfare, disliked by some subordinates, and liked by others. Hood's critics and opponents are always quoted by historians and authors, while those who spoke affectionately and sympathetically of Hood are frequently censored.

Gen. William Bate, commanding a division under Joseph Johnston and then Gen. Hood during the Atlanta Campaign (and the subsequent Tennessee Campaign) wrote in a letter to Gen. Braxton Bragg on Aug. 23, 1864, "I think our Army is now convinced of the ill effects of our long 'backslide' and that it might have been avoided by delivering battle north of the Etowah. With few exceptions, Gen. Hood has grown in favor with his command. As I told you, I had some apprehensions to the effect of the removal of Gen. Johnston for he was popular with his troops-but the opinion is gradually gaining lodgment in the popular mind of the army and country that in all such matters the President knows what is best and is generally correct."

Army of Tennessee Chaplain Dr. Charles Quitard wrote in his diary on Jan. 17, 1865. “General Hood has not fallen in the estimation of the officers of the Army. They still believe him gallant in action, judicious in counsel and competent in every way, but the troops long for Johnston and the country is crying out for him.”
 
On Jan. 9, 1865, noting that rumors abounded that Joe Johnston was to be restored to command of the Army of Tennessee, Dr. Quitard wrote, “…but I cannot but feel that it will be an act of injustice to General Hood. But these are the dark days of the revolution and Hood is too thoroughly a patriot to stand in the way of the country’s welfare. He would sacrifice himself in a moment for the good of the country.”

Col. Virgil S. Murphey of the 17th Alabama Infantry, who was captured at Franklin, wrote in his diary, "...our government had placed Hood in command, and as such I yielded to him my confidence and cordial cooperation."

While captive at Nashville awaiting transfer to Johnson's Island Prison, Murphey described the reaction of his fellow prisoners when they learned that Hood's army was approaching Nashville, "About 300 Yankee bounty jumpers and prisoners in the yard yelled with delight and declared their readiness to rejoin Hood."

Private Sam Watkins of the First Tennessee Infantry, and veteran of the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns, spoke frequently of the affection held by him and others for Hood. Watkins, whom prominent Civil War historian Shelby Foote calls "my favorite Civil War memorialist," wrote in his memoirs "Company Aytch," the following passages:

"He [Hood] was a noble, brave and good man, and we loved him for his virtues and goodness of heart. We all loved Hood, he was such a clever fellow, and a good man. Poor fellow, I loved him, not as a general, but as a good man. Every impulse of his nature was to do good, and to serve his country as best he could. General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die had been cast. Our cause had been lost before he took command. He fought with the everlasting grip of the bulldog and the fierceness of the wounded tiger. The army had been decimated until it was a mere skeleton...when he commenced his march into Tennessee."

Watkins offered a poignant testimony of his love for his former commander when he penned the following epitaph for General Hood in "The Southern Bivouac 2," (May 1884):

"But the half of brave Hood's body molders here:
The rest was lost in honor's bold career.
Both limbs and fame he scattered all around,
Yet still, though mangled, was with honor crowned;
For ever ready with his blood to part,
War left him nothing whole - except his heart."

Philip Daingerfield Stephenson of the Fifth Washington (Louisiana) Artillery wrote of Hood in his post war memoirs, "The one or two months of camp life prior to the Dalton Campaign added to the popularity of Hood - easily approached, of frank, open demeanor and lenient rule...he won the hearts of men right and left."

Army of Tennessee veteran, Sergeant Major Sumner A. Cunningham, wrote of Hood in "Confederate Veteran" magazine in April, 1893, "The removal of General Johnston, and the appointment of Hood to succeed him in command of the Army of Tennessee, was an astounding event. So devoted to Johnston were his men that the presence and immediate command of General Robert E. Lee would not have been accepted without complaint." However, Cunningham stated that the opinion of Hood evolved to where "...the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements. The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville."

Dr. Samuel Thompson of the 41^st Tennessee wrote after the war, "Many, we know, will disagree with us, but we think to calmly and impartially view General Hood's course we will be forced to accord to him abilities of the highest order and a military commander with but few superiors. What became of General Hood for the remainder of the war we do not know, but if he was removed for failure in Tennessee, he was treated very unjustly. That he did so, we believe was no fault of his. He failed simply because he had not men and supplies to contend with the immense force that was against him."

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