COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE
Maury County
(Hood's Tennessee Campaign)
November 24-29, 1864
After losing the city of Atlanta to Federal forces on September 1, 1864, the Army of Tennessee, commanded by General John Bell Hood, turned its back on Georgia and prepared for an invasion of Tennessee. It was the hope of the Confederacy that the Southern army could regain possession of Nashville, Tennessee, which had been occupied by Union forces since the fall of Fort Donelson in 1862.
Though Union general William T. Sherman was preparing his army for a "march to the sea," rumors of Hood's possible invasion of Tennessee deemed it necessary for him to plan accordingly. To reinforce that region of middle Tennessee, Sherman sent his most reliable subordinate, Major General George H. Thomas, to deal with Hood in the event the rumors proved true. Sherman then detached the IV Corps, commanded by Major General David S. Stanley, and the XXIII Corps, commanded by Major General John M. Schofield, sending them to Thomas at Nashville. Additionally, Sherman's newly appointed Chief of Cavalry, James H. Wilson, was sent to Tennessee to organize a cavalry force.
With four large corps, Sherman marched out of the smoldering ruins of Atlanta on November 17, heading deep into Georgia and in the opposite direction of Hood's army. When reports of this news reached Hood's headquarters at Tuscumbia, Alabama, Hood was frantic to get his army underway. For three weeks, the Confederate army had been stalled around Florence awaiting enough provisions for their upcoming campaign. When it became critical that they advance regardless of supplies, horrendous weather conditions caused Hood to delay their departure another four days. By the 21st of November, Hood was desperate and the foot-race to Columbia, Tennessee was on.
While Hood had remained idle, Thomas worked at organizing his forces from Nashville. Though Confederate cavalry clashed with Federal troopers on the road to Lawrenceburg on the 19th, both Thomas and Schofield doubted Hood's advance due to inclement weather. However, when cavalry scouts reported a third corps of Confederate infantry had crossed the Tennessee River on the 20th, Thomas warned Schofield, who had been put in command of Federal forces at Pulaski, Tennessee, to be on the lookout for Hood.
Hood's army of roughly 33,000 infantry and cavalry traveled along three separate routes: Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's Corps on the left, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee's Corps in the center and Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's Corps on the right. Confederate cavalry forces commanded by Nathan Bedford Forrest traveled in advance of the infantry to screen their movements. Despite a freezing, hard rain, the army was able to cover twelve miles on the 21st, camping for the night at Rawhide. By the 23d, Forrest's troopers had moved well out in front and began skirmishing with Federal cavalry. On this same day, Cheatham's Corps reached Waynesboro, Tennessee in the afternoon. The three Confederate corps now converged, traveling on the pike to Mount Pleasant, some forty-seven miles south of Columbia.
When Hood's advance was confirmed by Federal cavalry, Schofield issued orders on the 22d for two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps to move back to Lynnville, twenty miles north of Pulaski. Two divisions of Stanley's Fourth Corps were to evacuate Pulaski on the 23d. Schofield hoped to concentrate his forces of 22,000 at Columbia, which was now being held by a Federal garrison of 800.
On Thanksgiving morning, November 24th, Col. Horace Capron's brigade of Federal cavalry clashed with Forrest on the pike between Mount Pleasant and Columbia. Though stampeded, Capron attempted to make another stand seven-miles outside of Columbia. Orders were sent to Jacob Cox's division, who were encamped ten miles north of Lynnville, to hurry to Columbia and contest the advance of Confederate cavalry. Cox reached the outskirts of Columbia just as Capron's brigade, being pursued by Forrest's troopers, reached the town. Cox positioned his division across the Mount Pleasant Pike, bringing the Confederate advance to a halt. Hood had lost the race to Columbia by minutes.
In actuality, Hood's infantry had yet to reach Mount Pleasant and were still a day and a half march from Columbia. But upon Schofield's arrival at Columbia, on the 24th, he began building a defensive line of works around the town, anticipating a battle would be fought on the following day. Throughout the 24th, Federal infantry continued to come up from Pulaski.
When the 25th came and still no Confederate infantry were seen, Schofield made the decision to leave two divisions to hold the town of Columbia, while the remainder of his forces evacuated to the north bank of the Duck River. Learning that Hood was still some distance, his plan called for the evacuation on the evening of the 26th. Unfortunately for Schofield, the rains began anew, swelling the Duck and forcing the Federal commander to postpone his plans. Only two Federal brigades of Cox's, and Ruger's division were able to cross the Duck on the 26th.
On this same day, Hood's army moved up to within five miles of Columbia. Realizing that the Federal army held a strong position in his front, the Confederate commander decided to go around them. His plan called for a flanking maneuver that would put him twelve miles to the north and rear of Schofield's forces, effectively blocking the main route to Nashville. If all went according to plan, the Confederates would reach the small town of Spring Hill before Schofield knew his enemy had stolen the march on him. Hood's plan called for this maneuver to take place on the 27th but unfortunately, the swollen river, and the straggling of his pontoon train, forced him to delay his movement.
When rumors reached Schofield that Hood might try to cross the Duck River below his position, he ordered Wilson's cavalry to guard the fords along the river. The Federal army continued its withdrawal from Columbia throughout the day and evening of the 27th. Though Thomas, at Nashville, had wired Schofield to only evacuate Columbia "if necessary," Schofield would send the following telegram on the morning of the 28th: "I regret extremely the necessity of withdrawing from Columbia, but believe it was absolute. I will explain fully in time."
At 3 a.m., on the 28th, Confederate skirmishers discovered that the Federals in their front were on the move. They began to push on to the enemy's entrenchments, and by daylight the Confederates occupied the town of Columbia. On the northern edge of the town, the bridge crossing the Duck could be seen engulfed in flames. Hood immediately summoned Forrest, directing him to cross the river and get his cavalry between Schofield and Spring Hill. The remainder of the afternoon was spent getting his pontoons constructed at Davis' Ford, four miles east of Columbia. Ironically, this ford was left unguarded by Wilson's cavalry.
Forrest's three divisions crossed the river at Carr's Mill, Lilliard's Mill, Owen's Mill and Hardison's Mill. At the latter ford, located on the Franklin-to-Lewisburg pike, Buford's Division was initially thwarted in crossing by a portion of Capron's reinforced brigade. When Buford called on Forrest for help, Ross' Texas Brigade, of Jackson's Division, was sent to attack Capron from the rear. Cutting off Capron's men, after capturing an entire company and several flags, the Federals had to fight their way out to escape capture. Unknowingly, it was Wilson who had enabled Ross' men to attack Capron.
On the morning of the 28th, while his cavalry troops were spread along the Duck, Wilson had received word that Confederate cavalry was seen at the Lewisburg crossing. When these reports were confirmed in the afternoon, Wilson pulled the majority of his cavalry away from the river and ordered concentration at Hurt's Crossroads, located seven miles north of Hardison's Mill, on the Lewisburg Pike. This movement effectively pulled all of the Federal cavalry away from Schofield's left flank. Wilson, notifying Schofield that the enemy's cavalry had crossed the river on the roads leading to Spring Hill, now planned to move even further north. At 3 a.m., on the morning of the 29th, Wilson sent the following dispatch: "I think it is very clear that they are aiming for Franklin, and that you ought to get to Spring Hill by 10 a.m.." This dispatch reached Schofield at 8 a.m., on the morning of the 29th.
An hour following Wilson's warning to Schofield, Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps gathered at the Davis' Ford and awaited orders to cross. Two divisions of Lee's Corps, along with the bulk of Hood's artillery, would remain in Schofield's front to keep the Federals occupied while a flanking force of 19,000 would move quickly to Schofield's rear. Shortly after sunrise, Confederate cannon along the south banks of the Duck erupted into a thunderous roar, as Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne's Division stepped off to lead the way of the flanking maneuver. To move quickly, Hood would only take two artillery batteries, leaving his ordnance wagons and supplies behind with Lee. By 10 a.m., on the 29th, Hood's entire column was across the river, with Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson's Division, of Lee's Corps, bringing up the rear.
In Columbia, Schofield had sent word to Wilson to correct his mistake of pulling all cavalry from the army's east flank despite the enemy in his front. Wilson, accessing his situation, decided not to comply but to continue his northward movement. When Wilson's early morning telegram reached the Federal commander, he quickly ordered Stanley to proceed to Spring Hill with the wagon train. Stanley was instructed to take two of his divisions, Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball's and Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner's with him. Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood's division, who had been guarding the railroad bridge, was instructed to leaving one regiment at the bridge and retreat to Spring Hill with the remaining two. But when the Confederate artillery bombardment interrupted the morning silence, Schofield became indecisive and rescinded his earlier orders. Stanley was allowed to continue his retreat but only with Wagner's division. A Federal reconnaissance patrol was then organized to confirm Wilson's earlier reports.
By 10 a.m., Wagner's division was on the Columbia-to-Nashville pike and nine miles south of Spring Hill. At this same time, Forrest and Wilson were fighting a battle over the crossroads at Mount Carmel. This crossroads, located on Lewisburg Pike, led north to Franklin, west five miles to Spring Hill, or east to Nolensville Pike and Triune. After a fierce engagement, Wilson continued slowly moving north, presuming he was blocking Forrest's path to Franklin. But Forrest had other plans.
Leaving Ross' Texans in Wilson's front, Forrest and 5,000 of his cavalry were racing west on the Mount Carmel Road to Spring Hill. Having successfully brushed the Federal cavalry aside, Forrest hoped to take possession of the town, holding it until Hood's infantry could arrive. Unaware of the events unfolding, Wagner's division, following the ponderous Federal wagon train, moved at a leisurely pace towards Spring Hill.
Shortly after 10 a.m., Schofield received word from his reconnaissance patrol that they had spotted a column of Confederate infantry on the north side of the Duck River. He dashed off a note to Stanley, who was still over two miles away from Spring Hill, saying: "I will hold the enemy until dark, and then draw back. Select a good position at Spring Hill covering the approaches and send out parties to reconnoiter on all roads leading east and southeast. Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg Pike; tell him to cover Franklin and Spring Hill and try not to let the enemy get between us." Schofield then sat down to outline the withdrawal of Columbia. Due to Lee's continued pressure in his front, the withdrawal would take place under the cover of darkness on the 29th.
At 3 p.m., the reconnaissance patrol returned to Columbia, reporting that there was heavy enemy concentration in the Federal rear. This alarming news convinced Schofield that he should go personally to Spring Hill, taking two of Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger's brigades with him. By 3:30 p.m., Schofield was on the Columbia Pike heading for Spring Hill. The remainder of the Federal army would withdraw from Columbia as previously outlined.
Seeing the movement of Ruger's brigades from the south bank of the river, S. D. Lee thought an entire corps was on the move. Hoping to delay the Federal withdrawal further, and buy Hood more time, Lee decided to attempt a crossing in the late afternoon. Although several Federal regiments still occupied the rifle pits on the north bank, Lee managed to get his two divisions of infantry across during the evening. Thus with Lee's advance at sunrise on the 30th, the two armies had avoided a major battle at Columbia. Instead, both would find themselves caught up in a suspenseful drama in Spring Hill, Tennessee.
