John Bell Hood: Army Of Tennessee
Chickamauga & the Atlanta Campaign of 1864

The Battle of Chickamauga

In September of 1863, after recovering from his Gettysburg wound, Major General John Bell Hood was assigned to the Army of Tennessee. Hood was to command a division of Longstreet's Corps under army commander Braxton Bragg. Hood reported for duty at Ringgold, Georgia on September 18, 1863, and joined his division as they were positioning for the ensuing Battle of Chickamauga. Only two days later, Hood was severely wounded while directing his troops in the Confederate victory. The wound necessitated the amputation of his right leg, four inches below the hip. Hood would spend the next the four months in convalescence in Atlanta and Richmond.

(The amputation was performed by Dr. T. G. Richardson of New Orleans, who was Chief Medical Officer of the Army of Tennessee, and would after the war become president of the Medical Association of the United States [later the American Medical Association.] Dr. Richardson and Hood became lifelong friends with one of Hood's daughters, Ida Richardson Hood, being named after Dr. Richardson's wife. Dr. Richardson attended to Hood's wife, Anna Marie, during her terminal affliction of yellow fever in August 1879. General Hood and his oldest daughter Lydia would also succumb to the fever soon after Anna, but Dr. Richardson would be away during their illness.)

On September 24, 1863 Hood was recommended for promotion to lieutenant general by General James Longstreet for his decisive role in the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. Longstreet's letter to Confederate Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper said, "General- I respectfully recommend Major General J. B. Hood for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, for distinguished conduct and ability in the battle of the 20th inst. General Hood handled his troops with the coolness and ability that I have rarely known by any officer, on any field, and had the misfortune, after winning the battle, to lose one of his limbs." The Confederate Congress unanimously approved Hood's promotion on February 11, 1864.

The Atlanta Campaign: February 4, 1864 - July 17, 1864

No discussion or analysis of Sherman's Atlanta Campaign should be partaken without consideration of the political situation in the North in 1864. There was much public discontent in both the North and the South by the summer of 1864. The war had been raging for nearly three years. Hundreds of thousands of casualties had been sustained, and severe deprivations were being experienced by both populaces.

Confederate President Jefferson Davis' plan for gaining independence was to basically win the war by not losing it. If the South could endure the invasions and occupations by the Federals for an extended time period, it was hoped that the citizens of the North would lose the will to continue the war.

1864 was a presidential election year in the U. S. and the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, fervently anti-slavery and pro-war, stood in direct opposition to Democrats supporting peace negotiations. The Democrats were anti-slavery, but not as aggressively so as the Republican Party, and many Democrats supported peace negotiations with the Confederacy to end the war. General George McClellan, a fierce rival of Lincoln and supporter of peace negotiations with the South, would receive the presidential nomination of the Democrat Party in August 1864. Davis hoped that failures by General U. S. Grant in Virginia and General W. T. Sherman in Georgia would influence public opinion, force Lincoln to negotiate a peace settlement, or lead to McClellan's victory in the November election. Richard Beringer observed in "Why the South Lost the Civil War," "Northern war weariness also was applying pressures for peace on Abraham Lincoln, many Confederates thought, and the best way to increase the pressure was to win military victories." According to Larry E. Nelson, author of "Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policy for the U. S. Presidential Contest of 1864," Confederate military successes in Georgia/Tennessee would exacerbate internal problems in the North which included protests against emancipation, draft riots, and separatist tendencies in the Northwest. These factors, according to Nelson, "might result in the election of a presidential candidate amenable to Confederate independence."

Davis and the Confederate high command was confident of the ability of General Robert E. Lee to successfully defend Virginia, but were wary of General Joseph Johnston's task of defeating Sherman's forces in east Tennessee who were threatening Atlanta and the Confederate heartland. Davis had been dissatisfied with Johnston's two prior army commands, the first at the Peninsula in 1862, and then again in the Vicksburg/Jackson theater in 1863. However, after General Braxton Bragg's resignation following the Confederate defeat at Missionary Ridge, Johnston was appointed to command of the Army of Tennessee. (According to Davis' letter to the Confederate Congress of Feb. 18, 1865, other than Johnston, the only other candidates allowed by Confederate law for that position were Lee and Beauregard. In early 1864 the Confederate Congress had not yet passed legislation allowing for generals to receive temporary promotions by the president.)

Johnston was instructed by Davis and the Confederate high command to assume the offensive, and attack Sherman. Davis wrote, "...General Johnston entered upon this third important command-that of the army designed to recover the State of Tennessee from the enemy. In February, 1864, he was informed of the policy of the Government for his army. It was proposed to reinforce him largely, and that he should advance at once and assume the recovery of at least a part of the State of Tennessee." Johnston's reinforcements were summarized by Davis, "Troops were withdrawn from Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile to aid him. The main army of Alabama and Mississippi, under General Polk, was placed at his disposal. Cavalry was returned from East Tennessee to assist him." Davis also knew that Johnston required an aggressive subordinate commander who had experienced success in offensive warfare.

Davis had developed a close personal relationship with fellow Kentuckian John Bell Hood while he recovered from his Chickamauga wound in Richmond during the winter of 1863-1864. During this period Davis advised Hood of his intentions to reinforce Johnston's Army at Dalton, Georgia in the spring of 1864, and to move against the Federal army of General William T. Sherman at Chattanooga, Tennessee. Hood was offered a position as a corps commander under Johnston, and was advised by Davis that an aggressive campaign would be initiated against the Federals.

On February 4, 1864 Hood arrived in Dalton, Georgia, and assumed corps command in the Army of Tennessee under Johnston. (At this time Johnston's Army of Tennessee was combined with Lt. General Leonidas Polk's Army of Mississippi. The combined forces were placed under the supreme command of Johnston, and named the Army of Tennessee.)

However, Johnston failed to attack Sherman as ordered, rather, in early May of 1864 Sherman began the offensive against Atlanta. Johnston's Army of Tennessee fought defensive battles against the Federals at the approaches to Dalton, which was evacuated on May 13, then retreated 12 miles south to Resaca, and constructed defensive positions. However, after a brief battle, Johnston again yielded to Sherman, and retreated from Resaca on May 15. Johnston assembled the Confederate forces for a battle at Cassville, but on May 20 again retreated 8 miles further south to Cartersville. The month of May 1864 ended with Sherman's forces continuing their successful march toward Atlanta at the Battle of New Hope Church on May 25, the Battle of Pickett's Mill on May 27, and the Battle of Dallas on May 28.

In June the Federal forces continued maneuvers around the northern approaches to Atlanta, and battles ensued at Kolb's Farm on June 22, and the Confederates successfully repulsed Union forces at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain on June 27. However, by this time Federal forces were within 17 miles of Atlanta, threatening the city from the west and north. Johnston had yielded over one hundred miles of mountainous, and thus more easily defendable territory in 60 days, while the Confederate government and high command grew increasingly more frustrated and alarmed.

In early July General Braxton Bragg was sent to Atlanta by President Jefferson Davis to ascertain the situation with respect to Atlanta. After several meetings with local civilian leaders and Army of Tennessee commanders, Bragg returned to Richmond and urged President Davis to replace Johnston. After seriously considering Major General William Hardee and Hood for Johnston's replacement, President Davis solicited the advise of General Robert E. Lee, who on July 12 telegrammed Davis, "...Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a very high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter."

With the support of Bragg and various Confederate cabinet members, President Davis ultimately determined that Hood be promoted to the rank of full general, and replace Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee.

Although the fortunes of the Confederacy were showing signs of waning in the summer of 1864, perhaps Davis and his cabinet shared the opinion of John Bell Hood with English historian Percy Gregg, who had observed Hood's performance on the battlefields of Virginia. Gregg wrote of Hood and his troops "they never knew when they were beaten, or when they must be." With these traits, Hood was the choice of the Confederate government and high command to save Atlanta, and perhaps even the Confederacy itself.

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Command of The Army of Tennessee, The Siege of Atlanta

Federal forces had succeeded in cutting the Confederacy in half with the seizure of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. If Atlanta also fell, the eastern half of the Confederacy would be bisected. More importantly, the fall of Atlanta would virtually assure the reelection of Lincoln, and the continuation of a war of attrition that the South could not win. These were the stakes at Atlanta in late summer of 1864.

On July 17, 1864 Joseph Johnston was sent a telegram from Confederate Adjutant General Samuel Cooper advising him that he had been relieved of command of the Army of Tennessee. Approximately one hour later, John Bell Hood was notified that he had been promoted, and assigned command of the army. Cooper's telegram to Hood alluded to the desire of the Confederate high command for aggressive actions by advising Hood to"...be wary no less than bold."

On July 18, 1864 Hood, Hardee and General A. P. Stewart met to discuss the recent changes in command of the Army of Tennessee as ordered by Richmond, agreeing that a change of commanders at such a critical time would be highly undesirable. They decided to meet with Johnston, requesting that he stay on as commander "until the fate of Atlanta is decided." Johnston agreed to stay if the recent order was rescinded. Hood, Hardee and Stewart then sent a telegram to Davis seeking a remand of the order, advising Davis that it would be "dangerous to change the commander of this army at this particular time." Late in the evening Davis replied that he "cannot suspend (the order) without making the case worse than it was before the order was issued." Thus, John Bell Hood was promoted to the temporary rank of full general, replacing Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee.

The Battle of Peachtree Creek

On July 19 Hood received intelligence that Federal forces, then maneuvering around the perimeter of Atlanta, had split, with General George Thomas's corps being situated several miles west of the two corps of McPherson and Schofield. Hood found this a rare opportunity for Confederate forces to attack with the advantage of numerical superiority, with Thomas's Army of the Cumberland totaling approximately 18,000 troops. More importantly, at that time Thomas was beginning the process of crossing Peachtree Creek, and his forces would be vulnerable.

Hood quickly devised a plan to attack Thomas immediately after his forces completed their crossing of Peachtree Creek, but before they could finish construction of their entrenchments and defensive fortifications. His plan was to drive the Federals back down Peachtree Creek to the confluence with the Chattahoochee River, in the opposite direction of McPherson and Schofield, entrapping Thomas without an escape route, and without support of other Federal forces several miles away.

Hardee's Corps would be the key to the success of the battle, and would have an almost three to one numerical advantage over the Federal IV Corps. The remaining Confederate forces under A. P. Stewart would be numerically inferior to the Federal XX Corps, but their role would be less critical than Hardee's.

As the battle began, the Federal forces were indeed caught in a vulnerable position, but Hardee's attack lacked coordination and he only committed about one third of his forces against the Federals. The Confederate attack failed, and Hardee's forces withdrew back into their breastworks. In his book "Decision in the West," author Albert Castel blames the Confederate failure at Peachtree Creek on Hardee's poor coordination, and the "half hearted" performance of several of his regiments. Stewart's forces performed well, but lacked adequate numbers of troops. In summary, Castel writes, "In brief, where the Confederates had the advantage in strength, they did not fight well; and where they fought well, they were too weak. And because they did not fight well enough where they were strong enough, they lost. This in essence is the story of Peachtree Creek."

Both Federal and Confederate losses were approximately ten percent of the forces engaged at Peachtree Creek, 1,900 Federals and 2,500 Confederates were killed, wounded or captured.

The Battle of Decatur (a/k/a The Battle of Bald Hill, The Battle of Atlanta)

On July 21 McPherson's Union forces moved onto "Bald Hill," only two miles east of Atlanta, launching a howitzer bombardment of the city. He had also moved within striking distance of the Macon and Western railroad, Hood's only remaining supply line. Hood soon learned from his cavalry commander General "Fighting Joe" Wheeler, that McPherson's left (southeast) flank had become exposed, and that a large number of Federal supply wagons were situated in McPherson's rear, near Decatur. Hood viewed this as an opportunity to save the Macon railroad, end the bombardment of Atlanta, and destroy or capture McPherson's supplies. Furthermore, McPherson's forces, although in close proximity to Schofield, were still separated from Thomas's forces located immediately north of Atlanta.

Hood's plan was to commit 30,000 Confederate troops, virtually all available Confederate forces in Atlanta, on a bold attack whose success would depend on a long night march by Hardee's forces to the rear of McPherson, with an attack at daylight. Ultimately the attack would fail, due in large part to the understandable fatigue of Hardee's troops, which did not succeed in reaching the Federal rear before daylight on the morning of July 22. Due to straggling, only about two thirds of Hardee's troops were able to participate in the attack. Hardee's troops suffered fatigue and exhaustion from their participation in the earlier battle at Peachtree Creek, with many Confederates having not slept in three days.

Federal losses totaled 3,700, Confederate losses were approximately 5,500. However, the railroad remained open, and Atlanta remained in Confederate hands.

Hood had expected too much from his fatigued troops. As Castel states, "he tried to do too much with too little in too short a time."

The Battle of Ezra Church

In the early morning hours of July 28 Hood learned that Federal forces had withdrawn from positions to the southeast, indicating that the threat to the Macon railroad had subsided. Major General Oliver Howard's Union forces were maneuvering to the west of Atlanta and Hood anticipated the greatest threat to be from that area.

Hood promptly took countermeasures, designed to attack the Federals before they could entrench in their new positions. General Stephen D. Lee, who had arrived from Mississippi only a day earlier and assumed command of Hood's old corps, was to immediately move two divisions into position along Lick Skillet Road to block the Union advance. General A. P. Stewart was to move two divisions out of fortifications on Atlanta's northeast side and march down Lick Skillet Road, in the rear of Lee's division, to a point beyond the Federals' right flank, and attack the Federals from the right and rear. Hood's flanking plan was attempting to do what the Army of Tennessee was unable to do at Decatur. However this time Hood would assign the heavy fighting task to Stewart's troops, who had performed magnificently at Peachtree Creek on July 20th. And unlike the problem at Decatur, ample time for the flanking march was provided...a full 24 hours. Finally, Hood had assigned the entire operation to two commanders, Stewart and Lee, who unlike Hardee (as Hood opined,) believed in aggressive tactics.

As the plan unfolded, Lee's forces moved into position, engaging the Federals one half mile north of Lick Skillet Road. As Stewart's divisions came into position, moving behind Lee along the road toward the Federal right flank, Lee approached Stewart and suggested that Hood had changed the plan, and that Stewart's troops were to immediately attack to the left of Lee's divisions. Hood had not changed the plan, and instead of Stewart's divisions continuing for another mile before attacking the Federal right and rear, Lee had convinced Stewart to immediately join in his attack.

The Federals easily repulsed the Confederate attack, and inflicted over 3,000 casualties, while suffering only 600 Union casualties. Castel writes in "Decision in the West," "Historians will blame Hood for this slaughter. The true culprit is Stephen Lee. Disregarding his instructions and ignoring subsequent orders, he attempted to crush Sherman's supposedly vulnerable right flank with impromptu and disjointed attacks by his own and Stewart's troops long after the failure of the first one demonstrated that they had no chance of success-the exact duplicate of his conduct two weeks earlier in Tupelo, from which experience he obviously learned nothing. What he should have done is what Hood had directed him to do-simply keep open the Lick Skillet Road for the passage of Stewart's forces..."

After the severe setback at Ezra Church, Hood's defenders did achieve some successes. Sherman sent a large contingent of Union cavalry under Brigadier General Edward McCook and Major General George Stoneman on a raid to cut Hood's remaining railroad lifeline to the south, and to then possibly move on to Andersonville and release the thousands of Federal prisoners. On July 31 and August 1 McCook's cavalry was routed by General Joe Wheeler at Brown's Mill, south of Atlanta, and Stoneman and most of his cavalry were captured at Sunshine Church by Confederate forces under Brigadier General Alfred Iverson. With these losses, two thirds of Sherman's entire cavalry was destroyed. Then, on August 5 and 6 a Federal movement at Utoy Creek was repulsed by Confederate defenders.

However, on August 29 an impatient Sherman began another movement to the south of Atlanta intended to cut the vital Macon railroad. Federal forces under General Howard succeeded in reaching positions only 600 yards from the Macon and Western Railroad depot at Jonesboro, 15 miles south of Atlanta. With Federal artillery then in a position to bombard the railroad facilities, Hood ordered an attack by Hardee's corps, and planned to commence the assault before the Federals could construct defenses. Hardee's troops would again have numerical superiority over the Federals of Major General John Logan, and Hood was confident of forcing the Federals away, alleviating the threat to the railroad. However, as had occurred in virtually every Confederate attack, troops were late in arriving into positions. Major General Patrick Cleburne's division took almost 12 hours to travel 12 miles, and S. D. Lee's forces arrived late, and exhausted. According to Castel, " (Lee's) troops have had little sleep for two nights, they have marched from twelve to fifteen miles...many are shoeless and footsore, all are half exhausted and hungry, and hundreds have dropped out along the way, unable or unwilling to keep going."

As the battle began, the Confederate assault, as usual, became uncoordinated. S. D. Lee, as Castel explains, was again at the center of the problems. "At 3 P.M. ...Cleburne's skirmishers start forward. Lee, displaying the same aggressive spirit and talent for blundering that he revealed at Tupelo and Ezra Church, mistakes their fire for the beginning of Cleburne's assault. At once he commands his corps to charge." Castel continues, "Meanwhile Cleburne's attack gets under way and almost immediately degenerates into farcical chaos."

The battle soon ended, with the Confederates failing miserably. Even with approximately three-fourths of the total Confederate forces in the Atlanta area committed, Hardee suffered 2,200 casualties, while Union losses totaled only 179.

With Hardee's defeat at Jonesboro, Atlanta's fate was sealed, and Hood ordered the evacuation of the Army of Tennessee. The evacuation was completed on September 2, 1864. Hood's forces retreated through Lovejoy's Station, and into rural Georgia.

On Sept. 15, 1864, Confederate Major General G. W. Smith, commander of the Georgia State Militia, which participated in the defense of Atlanta, wrote in his Official Report to Gen. Hood, "Had your (Hood's) orders been properly executed, either upon the 20th of July, at Peach Tree Creek, the 22nd of July, on our right (Decatur or Bald Knob), or on the 30th of August, at Jonesboro, Sherman could have been foiled and Atlanta saved at least for some time to come, and I am not alone in this opinion."

The Army of Tennessee spent the next several weeks campaigning in northwest Georgia and northeast Alabama harassing Federal supply and communications lines, and attempted to draw Sherman out of Atlanta. Sherman remained in and around Atlanta, unwilling to engage Hood. Finally, in early November Sherman destroyed all logistical facilities in Atlanta, and began his "March to the Sea," ultimately capturing Savannah, Charleston, Columbia and Wilmington.

When Sherman departed Atlanta for Savannah, Hood's forces were over 150 miles away. With a successful pursuit of Sherman considered impossible, Hood's forces marched west to Florence, Alabama. On November 21, 1864 the Army of Tennessee departed Florence on their ill-fated invasion of Tennessee. Their ultimate goal of the capture of Federal held Nashville would fail on December 16, 1864.

Sources:

• Castel, Albert. "Decision in the West," University Press of Kansas, 1992
• Hood, J. B. "Advance and Retreat," Blue and Gray Press, 1985
• Beringer, et al, Richard E. "Why the South Lost the Civil War," University of Georgia Press, 1985
• Nelson, Larry E. "Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric: Confederate Policy for the United States Presidential Contest of 1864," University of Alabama Press, 1980
• Sherman, William T. "The Memoirs of W. T. Sherman," Penguin Books, 2000
• Johnston, Joseph E. "Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War," Indiana University Press, 1959
• Davis, Jefferson. "The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume II," Da Capo Press, 1990